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Reason of State and the Emergent
Constitution of Controlt
Arthur S. Miller*
No society in recorded history has ever been able to dispense with politi-
cal power. This is as true of liberalism as of absolutism, as true of lais-
sez faire as of an interventionist state. No greater disservice has been
rendered to political science than the statement that the liberal state
was a "weak" state. It was precisely as strong as it needed to be in the
circumstances. It acquired substantial colonial empires, waged wars,
held down internal disorders, and stabilized itself over long periods of
time.
-Franz Neumann 1
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is a speculative essay.2 Its main theme is that
the United States is moving, without announcement or fanfare,
into government under a fourth constitution, a development
that can be appropriately labeled the Constitution of Control.
Preceding this emerging fourth constitution were three other
fundamental laws, two of which still exist: the Articles of Con-
federation, the 1787 Constitution of Quasi-Limitations (usually
misnamed the Constitution of Limitations), and the Constitu-
tion of Powers. Currently, few people pay any attention to the
first constitution, the Articles of Confederation, although some
who fear the power of the State advocate that the Articles be
resurrected and put into effect.3 However desirable that propo-
sal might be in theory, it will not happen. Accordingly, the fo-
cus herein will be on the second constitution, the Constitution
t Copyright 1980 by Arthur S. Miller. This Article is based upon the au-
thor's work in progress, a book tentatively entitled Democratic Dictatorship:
The Emergent Constitution of Control.
* Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University.
1. F. NEumANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AuTHoRiTARL&N STATE 8 (1957).
2. My aim is to suggest a way of thinking about the current direction of
American constitutional development and to propose a model of the future.
The Article is thus an exercise in extrapolation, drawing upon past experience
and projecting certain trends as modified by the likely social conditions of the
next fifty years. There is, of course, no way at this time to prove the validity of
the proposed model.
3. See, e.g., W. WILLIams, AMERICA CONFRONTS A REVOLUTIONARY WORLD,
1776-1976 (1976).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of Quasi-Limitations-the politico-legal palimpsest drafted in
1787 and amended twenty-six times-and its two overlays, the
third and fourth constitutions.
The second constitution was predominant from 1789, when
the first government was formed, until about 1937. The first
overlay, the third constitution, was added when the Supreme
Court constitutionalized the New Deal, permitting a govern-
ment with affirmative obligations. Professor Edward S. Corwin
correctly labelled this overlay a "Constitution of Powers in a
secular state."4 When the Employment Act of 1946 was
passed,5 the new posture of government was clearly evident:
the Positive State had emerged.6 Simultaneously, still another
layer was developing, in a process that by 1980 has become
clear: a fourth constitution, the Constitution of Control, is
emerging. This Article outlines that historical development as
reflected not only in judicial decisions, but also in other govern-
mental actions. Following the description of the development
of the fourth constitution, is a description of the "climacteric"--
the coalescence of crises-in which Americans now find them-
selves. Finally, an extrapolation of these past trends reveals an
emerging constitutional troika, a troika which includes the co-
existent second, third, and fourth constitutions, but which also
indicates that the fourth constitution, the Constitution of Con-
trol, is becoming preeminent.
4. See generally E. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR
STATE (1951). Professor Corwin described the replacement of a Constitution of
Rights by a Constitution of Powers in these terms: "[T] he Federal System has
shifted base in the direction of a consolidated national power, while within the
National Government itself an increased flow of power in the direction of the
President has ensued." Id. at 2. See also E. CORWIN, AMERICAN CONsTrru-
TIONAL HISTORY (1964).
5. Ch. 33, 60 Stat. 23 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025 (1976
& Supp. 1979)).
6. In briefest terms, the Positive State is a label for express accept-
ance by the federal government-by government generally and thus by
the people-of affirmative responsibility to further the economic well-
being of all the people. It is a societal undertaking of a duty to attempt
to create and maintain minimal conditions within the economy-of eco-
nomic growth, of employment opportunities, of the basic necessities of
life.
A.S. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 86-87 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A.S. MILLER, THE
MODERN CORPORATE STATE]. For further discussion of the Positive State, see
id. at 86-112; A.S. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM 72-
132 (1968). For further discussion of the Employment Act of 1946, which de-
clared the federal government's policy and responsibility to be, inter alia, "to
promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power," 15 U.S.C.
§ 1021 (1976), see E. RoSTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM: THE PUBLIC LAW OF
AMERICAN CAPITALISM 10-29 (1959).
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Constitutional law and government, as Franz Neumann has
observed,7 have always been relative to circumstances. Sup-
posedly constitutional absolutes have a way of being diluted by
the crush of the exigencies faced by succeeding generations of
Americans. One of the great silences of the fundamental law
has thus taken on sufficient substantive content to allow one to
assert, with little fear of contradiction, that a concept of "reason
of state" (raison d'etat) is now an integral part of the Constitu-
tion. My purpose is to examine the development of this princi-
ple (constitutional reason of state) and its implications for the
future. To put it another way, the discussion focuses on the ex-
tent to which certain Machiavellian principles have become,
and will become, part of American constitutional law.
First, however, it is necessary to define the concept of rea-
son of state. Not mentioned in the second constitution, it is
"the State's first Law of Motion,"8 "the doctrine that whatever
is required to ensure the survival of the state must be done by
the individuals responsible for it, no matter how repugnant
such an act may be to them in their private capacity as decent
and moral men."9
Second, it is necessary also to define the term "State."
Again unmentioned by the drafters of the second constitution,
there is no shorthand definition for this term. The State is not
a "thing"; rather, it is an abstraction-a construct that is not sy-
nonymous with either government or society. Government is
the apparatus of the State and society is that which is gov-
erned-in appearance a collective of individuals, but in reality
an aggregate of interacting groups. The Supreme Court has not
made that careful distinction; the Justices routinely use the
three terms-State, government, and society-synonymously.
7. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
8. F. MEINECKE, MACHIAVELLISM: THE DOCTRINE OF RAISON D'PTAT AND ITS
PLACE IN MODERN HISTORY 1 (D. Scott trans. 1957) (first published in Germany
in 1925 with the title of Die Idee der Staatsrason in der neueren Geschichte).
Meinecke writes: "Whatever the circumstances the business of ruling is... al-
ways carried out in accordance with the principles of raison d'etat. Raison
d'etat may be deflected or hindered by real or imaginary obstacles, but it is
part and parcel of ruling." Id. at 25. My purpose in writing this Article is to
show that Meinecke's assertion is valid for the United States, even with-- per-
haps, despite-its written Constitution.
Meinecke's book is indispensable to an understanding of constitutionalism,
American or otherwise-Professor Friedrich has expressed the opinion that
Meinecke's book "is without doubt one of the most important recent contribu-
tions to the history of political ideas." C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON
OF STATE: THE SURVIVAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 120 (1957).
9. G. FRIEDRICH, supra note 8, at 4-5.
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The State has no physical existence. Like the business-cor-
poration, it is an artificial being, invisible and intangible, ex-
isting only in legal and constitutional theory. Even though it
cannot be seen, it is nevertheless as real as a natural person.
In fact, the State is even more "real," for whenever its will col-
lides with the wills of natural persons, it always prevails in any
matter considered important by those who wield effective
power in the nation. Such a conclusion will become more evi-
dent through an examination of several historical episodes. Fi-
nally, the State is monistic, in Gierke's sense-it is a "super-
group-person" created by the joinder of the political govern-
ment of the nation, states, and localities with the economic gov-
ernment of the giant corporations and other social groups.O
Public government and corporations coexist in a syzygetic sys-
tem."
II. THE PAST AS PROLOGUE: TWO MORALITIES IN
PUBLIC BEHAVIOR
An understanding of the past is necessary in order to gain
an understanding of where we are now and where we are likely
to be in the future. Although neither the present nor the future
are mere extensions of the past, history cannot be escaped; ad-
herence to it, as Holmes said, is not a duty but a necessity. In
order to more fully understand the past, an organizing theory is
necessary. The thesis of this Article is derived from Machiavel-
li: "I claim," he said in The Discourses, "that republics which,
in imminent danger, have recourse neither to a dictatorship,
nor to some form of authority analogous to it, will always be ru-
ined when grave misfortune befalls them."' 2
An important caveat, however, must be added to this the-
ory: in the case of the United States, the dangers that have
triggered extraordinary responses have not been limited to
10. See 0. GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800.
(E. Barker trans. 1958); text accompanying notes 108-115 infra. See also text ac-
companying notes 151-154 infra.
11. Syzygy is a biological term, meaning the joinder of two organisms with
each retaining its own identity. For a discussion of the syzygetic system of the
United States, see generally A.S. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE,
supra note 6. See also M. KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX (1972); THE ECONOMY
AS A SYSTEM OF POWER (W. Samuels ed. 1979); A NEW HISTORY OF LEVIATHAN
(R. Radosh & M. Rothbard eds. 1972).
12. N. MACHIAVELLi, THE DISCOURSES, I, § 34 [hereinafter cited as THE Dis-
COURSES]. This volume, of greater importance than The Prince, was published
in 1531. All references to The Discourses are to the Pelican paperback edition
edited by Professor Bernard Crick and published in 1970.
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"grave misfortune."' 3 All types of emergencies, as defined by
political officers, have caused the agents of the State to exer-
cise authority derived from raison d'etat. Included are wars
and rumors of wars (cold wars), internal subversion (actual or
supposed), economic depression, labor strife, actions of dissi-
dent groups, and natural disasters. Or, as Hannah Arendt said,
Necessity, since the time of Livy and through the centuries, has meant
many things that we today would find quite sufficient to dub a war un-
just rather than just. Conquest, expansion, defense of vested interests,
conservation of power in view of the rise of new and threatening pow-
ers,... all these well-known realities of power politics were not only
actually the causes of the outbreaks of most wars in history, they were
also recognized as 'necessities,' that is, as legitimate motives to invoke
a decision by arms.
14
Arendt and Machiavelli speak of violence, but our canvas is
wider and deeper. There are weapons other than violence at
the command of those who control the State. The series of his-
torical examples set out below'5 constitute some, but far from
all, of the situations in which extraordinary political responses
occurred (the use of violence being only an extension of poli-
tics). The governing principle is that a given situation must be
perceived by the ruling elite or elites to be an emergency
before extraordinary action is even contemplated. That action
when taken is usually in accord with what can be called the
Principle of the Economy of Means. An extraordinary response
is employed only to the extent necessary to achieve limited
objectives.
The possibility of an extraordinary political response in an
emergency demonstrates the fact that two moralities of public
behavior have always existed in the United States. One is what
government officers do in fact; the other is the ideal epitomized
in the concept of constitutionalism.16 Emergency (or crisis)
government is a classic illustration. The Constitution contains
no express provision for emergency action. Even so, that si-
lence has never been a barrier to any action deemed desirable
by ruling elites.' 7 The meaning is clear: a dualism runs
13. The triggering dangers extend far beyond those discussed by Professor
Clinton Rossiter, who mentions the Civil War, World Wars I and 11, and the
Great Depression. See C. RossrrER, CONsTrruTIoNAL DICTATORsHmp: CmsIs
GovERNmENT IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES. (References in this Article to this sem-
inal work are to the 1963 paperback edition).
14. IL ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 13 (paperback ed. 1973).
15. See pp. 594-612 infra.
16. See NoMos XX: CoNsTrrUoNALaUsM passim (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1979).
17. But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343
U.S. 579 (1952). The Steel Seizure case, in which the Court rejected President
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
through American constitutional history. The law in books
says one thing, while the law in action says another. Orthodox
constitutional theory acknowledges only the ideal-stated, for
example, by Justice Davis in Ex parte Milligan:18
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doc-
trine involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by
the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads di-
rectly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it
is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all
the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence;
as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off
its just authority. 19
That is a nice sentiment, were it true; but it is not. An "evident
piece of arrant hypocrisy,"20 the statement was an attempt to
bring a single truth to the development of American constitu-
tionalism. Justice Davis and others have failed in this effort.
An example is the way in which the Supreme Court neatly
avoided the rule of Milligan in the later case of Ex parte Qui-
rin.21
In distinguishing the two public moralities, Machiavelli is
again relevant. Sir Isaiah Berlin, in his brilliant interpretive es-
say, "The Originality of Machiavelli,"22 argues that the Floren-
tine proposed a radical dualism---"two incompatible ideals of
life, and therefore two moralities."23 The first was the morality
of the pagan world, whose values were "courage, vigor, forti-
tude in adversity, public achievement, order, discipline, happi-
ness, strength, justice, and above all the assertion of one's
Truman's justifications, based on raison d'etat, for taking over the steel indus-
try, should be seen as an exception. There can be little question that had Con-
gress and the President been in agreement, the seizure would have been
upheld. See E. CoRwIN, THE PRESIDENT. OFFICE AND POWERS 154-58 (4th rev.
ed. 1957).
18. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
19. Id. at 120-21.
20. Ex parte Milligan was so labelled by Professor Corwin, in E. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 165 (2d rev. ed. 1941), quoted in C. Ros-
SrIER & R. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 38
(expanded ed. 1976).
21. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). This largely forgotten "case of the Nazi saboteurs" is
of considerable importance in any analysis of presidential power. Compare F.
BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHO~rSY 325-43 (1962) with A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE:
PILLAR OF THE LAW 652-59 (1956). Biddle was the Attorney General in 1942,
Stone the Chief Justice. Further discussion of the context in which the case
arose may be found in C. RossrrER & R. LONGAKER, supra note 20, at 6-7, 112-16.
22. Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, in STUDIES ON MACHIAVELLI 149
(M. Gilmore ed. 1972).
23. Id. at 169.
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proper claims and the knowledge and power needed to secure
their satisfaction."24 Machiavelli called this morality virts, not
translatable as "virtue" but as "manliness." Much of American
history reflects a pursuit of these values. The second morality,
of equal importance, is derived from the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion, whose ideals are "charity, mercy, sacrifice, love of God,
forgiveness of enemies, contempt for the goods of this world,
faith in the life hereafter, belief in the salvation of the individ-
ual soul as being of incomparable value-higher, indeed wholly
incommensurable with, any social or political or other terres-
trial goal, any economic or military or aesthetic considera-
tion."25
In shorthand terms, the first (pagan) morality values secur-
ity, both internal and external, which might be called social or-
der.2 6 The second morality involves human dignity, that which
Felix Cohen called "the good,"27 the notion of legally reified de-
cency, which is a distillation of the Bill of Rights and the ideals
of American constitutionalism. In Milligan, Justice Davis
stated a view of American constitutionality that, at least implic-
itly, adopted Berlin's second morality. Justice Davis did not, of
course, employ the language of Judeo-Christian morality. That
ideal finds its clearest statement in political speeches and in
the underlying assumptions of American constitutionalism. 28
In theory, constitutionalism in the United States not only indi-
24 Id.
25. Id.
26. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) (security is the "ul-
timate value").
27. See generally F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS (1933).
28. The second, or Judeo-Christian, morality emphasizes both the value of
the individual and limits on the ability of the individual to seek satisfaction of
some desires. The individual's salvation and relationship with God is para-
mount, but the individual is also to act in harmony with a set of materially self-
effacing precepts that elevate the worth of others. This is in contrast to the pa-
gan morality, under which the needs of others are necessarily inferior to per-
sonal goals.
The Christian tradition was strong among the early settlers of this country
and it has remained so; it formed the framework within which American politi-
cal institutions were created. The formal rules of societal institutions parallel
those of Christians. The power of collective society, embodied in government,
was under the Constitution to be contained within certain proscriptive rules.
The most important of these rules protect the "inalienable" rights of individu-
als-especially rights to fair treatment and certain basic liberties. Thus, Judeo-
Christian emphases on the importance of the individual and on circumscribed
prerogatives was embodied in American institutions from the beginning. Nor
has our Judeo-Christian heritage been forgotten by those in government. See
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."). This is not to say that the formal
law was, or is, in consonance with the living law.
1980]
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cates the ideal of the dignity of the individual human being, but
is also an articulation of limited government. Due process,
broadly defined, is its central core.29 The principle of limited
government, however, is merely the facade of American consti-
tutionalism. The unpleasant reality is that the actions of public
officers often comport with the precepts of the pagan morality;
indeed, more frequently than many Americans like to think,
public action cannot be justified under either morality. Berlin's
point is not that one morality is superior to the other (although
Machiavelli, of course, adhered to the pagan), but that there
are two goals-two ideals--of human endeavor, both used as
norms by human beings, that are incompatible with one an-
other.
This dichotomy causes intellectual confusion and a gap be-
tween pretense and reality in official behavior. At times, the
goals merge in Supreme Court opinions; when they do, the
Court usually chooses the pagan over the Judeo-Christian mo-
rality. The Court, however, often attempts to rationalize its de-
cisions (as did Justice Davis) in terms of the latter. So, too, do
other government officers.
The unavoidable conclusion is that if there is a single mo-
rality in American constitutionalism, it is that of the pagan val-
ues as delineated by Machiavelli. That is a harsh accusation.
Berlin does not make it, his essay being an analysis of
Machiavelli, not an application of the Florentine to any nation.
Is there evidence sufficient to buttress such a conclusion? The
answer, as will be shown, can only be "yes." Machiavelli is rel-
evant to the United States, despite the popular wisdom about
him, because he was the first to make the radical dualism in
governmental affairs so plain. In his writings (mainly The Dis-
courses and The Prince) he plunged a sword "into the flank of
the body politic of Western humanity, causing it to shriek and
rear up. ' 30 The pain of that sword's thrust is still with us, five
centuries after Machiavelli. It is a pain, a contradiction, that
has never been directly confronted or reconciled in our consti-
tutional history. The dualism is, of course, disturbing to people,
29. See NoMos XVIII: DUE PROCESS passim (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1977); Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law?, in A.S. MILLER, SO-
CIAL CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 97
(1979).
30. F. MEINECKE, supra note 8, at 49. Professor Crick, in his Introduction
to THE DIsCOURSES, supra note 12, at 13, 67, quotes Meinecke's assertion then
adds, "The pain is still with us and if we ever cease to feel it, it will not be be-
cause the conditions that gave rise to it have miraculously vanished but be-
cause our nerves have gone dead."
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including judges, who are insistent on finding a single truth, or
who otherwise evade such an awkward duality. Not that
Machiavelli preferred a prince; despite the belief to the con-
trary, he recognized that "republics are to be preferred if you
can get them."3 1 But republics must provide for emergency
measures; and even "democracies" act, when their leaders con-
sider it necessary, contrary to the Rule of Law. Few will appre-
ciate the proposition that the primary truth to be distilled from
our heritage is that pagan virtues prevail, but it cannot be de-
nied, particularly when it is seen that in the past (even if not in
the future) extraordinary actions to meet emergencies were
limited in time and space in accordance with the Principle of
Economy of Means.
Can one, then, distinguish between the circumstances fit
for republican-i.e., democratic-rule and those suited for per-
sonal rule? That was Machiavelli's central concern. And that,
one would think, should be a fundamental concern of American
constitutional scholars in the future. It is the crucial question,
one that is not yet resolved in theory and seldom even asked.
This Article is a preliminary examination of this question.
In what follows, the inevitable conclusion is that there is no
middle course between the two moralities. To repeat: one mo-
rality-the Judeo-Christian-is the theory of the formal Consti-
tution (it is one way of stating the American Dream);32 the
other (pagan) morality is the guiding principle of the "living"
Constitution. The concept of a living Constitution is ambigu-
ous, for it refers to two different phenomena. In its usual sense,
it means the way in which specific constitutional terms have
evolved through time.33 Due process, equal protection, and in-
terstate commerce are ready examples. As important as this
evolution is, there is another dimension of equal and perhaps
greater importance: the Constitution "in operation." Silences
of the fundamental law, particularly with respect to executive
power, are filled (as in reason of state or executive privilege);
"structural" changes in the organization of government occur
(as in the system of federalism and separation of powers). The
most important aspect of our constitutional law is not what the
document says or even what the Supreme Court says; rather, it
is what is done by government officers, including the officers of
31. Crick, Introduction to THE DIscoURsEs, supra note 12, at 22.
32. See R. MILES, AWAKENING FROM THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE SocIAL
AND POLrricAL Lnnrs TO GROWTH (1976).
33. See W. WILsoN, CONGRESSIONAL GovERNmENT 28-31 (1956) (originally
published 1885).
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the private governments of the nation. They follow the iron law
of necessity-necessity as perceived by the effective holders of
power of the nation-even though, as Milton recognized, neces-
sity is the plea of every tyrant.34 Support for this observation is
found in an examination of historical examples from several
contexts.
A. USE OF VIOLENCE
One option available to American policy makers is the cal-
culated use of violence. As Professor Abraham Sofaer has
shown, 35 presidents since George Washington have employed
violence, usually without a declaration of war, when they con-
sidered it necessary. The second constitution expressly gives
Congress the power to declare war, with the Chief Executive
being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.36 This lan-
guage could be interpreted to mean that the President has tac-
tical control of troops once they are committed to war by
Congress. But that is only partially true. In a clear example of
why the second constitution should be called one of "quasi-lim-
itations," presidents have often tacitly invoked the principle of
reason of state to take such violent measures as they consid-
ered necessary.
It is not necessary to list all of the instances in which the
principle has been invoked. Four illustrative examples will suf-
fice to show the pattern: the Civil War, World War II, Korea,
and Vietnam.37 Each illustrates some of the common elements
of American usage of raison d'etat, including: (a) the Presi-
dent usually takes such action as he deems necessary to meet
the threat, whether the threat is actual, as in the case of the
Civil War; probable, as in the period prior to World War II; du-
bious, as during the Korean War; or nonexistent, as during the
34. "[A]nd with necessity, [t]he tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deeds."
J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST 41 (1894) (bk. iv, line 393).
35. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE
ORIGINS (1976).
36. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 with id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
37. Another prominent example is the treatment accorded the American
Indians under many presidents, both by use of the military and by other
means. Until recently, Indians, aggregated into tribes, were "nonpersons"
under the Constitution. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-14,
at 1014-15 (1978). That enabled them to be driven from their lands, systemati-
cally killed, and otherwise brutally dealt with despite the due process clauses.
These actions are too well known to need extensive documentation or further
discussion. See generally D. BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE
(1972). No branch of government protected Indians until long after they had
been entirely subdued and penned up on reservations.
[Vol. 64.585
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American involvement in Vietnam; (b) Congress and th6 Presi-
dent typically act in concert, with Congress serving largely as a
rubber stamp for Executive proposals;38 (c) the courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, generally do not inhibit whatever ac-
tions the political officers wish to take; the judges, in effect,
either confess a self-imposed impotence or uphold the political
actions; (d) except for relatively few persons, civil liberties are
not disturbed; the populace at large is not involved; depriva-
tions are usually economic rather than physical (personal); (e)
violence is limited in time and space; and (f) violence is em-
ployed only to the extent necessary to achieve postulated goals
(with some notable exceptions, such as the use of atomic
bombs in 1945 and the scorched-earth policy pursued in Viet-
nam)-this is the Principle of Economy of Means in the use of
violence.
1. The Civil War
"Is there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness?
Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties
of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?" So
asked President Lincoln on July 4, 1861.39 Historically, the an-
swer is clear. a nation-this nation--can fight a successful total
war and still remain a "republic." At best, the Constitution was
bent in such circumstances; at worst, it was simply ignored.40
Lincoln came to office "with little more than an acute un-
derstanding of his obligation to see to the due execution of the
laws."4 1 But he had also sworn to uphold the Constitution, and
in his inaugural address he promised that he would preserve
the Union. Congress was not in session when fighting began at
Fort Sumter. The President proceeded on his own, without re-
gard to law or constitutional processes. Lincoln described his
reasons for assuming broad authority:
It became necessary for us to choose whether, using only the existing
means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should
38. See C. RossrrER, supra note 13, at 242 (broad delegation of power from
Congress to President Wilson during World War I).
39. See id. at 1 (quoting a message to Congress by President Lincoln).
40. Nuclear warfare would add a completely different dimension. If such a
war occurs, as it might, there can be no question but that a rigid dictatorship
would be imposed and kept in power indefinitely. See Rossiter, What of Con-
gress in Atomic War?, 3 W. PoL Q. 602 (1950); Rossiter, Constitutional Dictator-
ship in the Atomic Age, 11 REv. PoL 395 (1949). But cf. C. RossrrER, supra note
13, at 300, 306, 310-11 (proposing strict limitations on the duration of any emer-
gency dictatorship).
41. N. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENcY 31
(1932).
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let the Government fall at once into ruin, or whether, availing myself of
the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrec-
tion, I would make an effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the
present age and for posterity.
4 2
The flaw in Lincoln's justification is obvious: these
"broader powers" he described do not exist as such in the for-
mal Constitution. Lincoln had to draw up Machiavellian princi-
ples of raison d'etat to justify his actions. Interpreting his task
as confronting a gigantic mob and dispersing it (the govern-
ment being faced "by combinations too powerful to be sup-
pressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings"), 43 the
President took the following actions before calling Congress
into session: (a) he mobilized 75,000 of the state militia by ex-
ecutive proclamation; (b) he blockaded the ports of the rebel-
lious states, again by proclamations; (c) he added nineteen
warships to the navy "for purposes of public defense";44 (d) he
called for 42,000 volunteers and enlarged both the regular army
and the navy in an "amazing disregard for the words of the
Constitution";45 (e) he spent public money in disregard of the
constitutional requirement that "no Money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law";46 and (f) he authorized suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, again by proclamation.47
When Congress finally convened in July 1861, it speedily
ratified President Lincoln's actions. In the leading judicial deci-
sion evaluating his authority for such actions, the Prize Cases,48
the Supreme Court held the blockade to be constitutionally
warranted, stating.
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-chief,
in suppressing an insurrection, has met with armed resistance, and a
civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to
them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him,
and this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the politi-
42. 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 78 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)
[hereinafter cited as MESSAGES AND PAPERS].
43. The language is that of the Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424
(current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (1976)).
44. 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 42, at 78.
45. C. ROSSITER, supra note 13, at 226.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
47. This is taken from Professor Rossiter's account. See C. RossrrER,
supra note 13, at 225-28.
48. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). See also Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas.
144 (1861). In Merryman, Chief Justice Taney, sitting alone on circuit, held
President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus to be invalid. The
President soon defied Taney's decision. For an account of the Merryman epi-
sode, see J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 118-39 (rev.
ed. 1951).
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cal department of the Government to which this was entrusted.... He
[the President] must determine what degree of force the crisis de-
mands 9
The Constitution had thus been neatly amended, and raison
d'etat thereafter became an operative principle of our funda-
mental law. The "imperial presidency" was born.
2. World War II
The precedent set by Lincoln in the Civil War and given a
cachet of legitimacy in the Prize Cases presaged the acts of
President Franklin Roosevelt before and during World War H.
In the period before the war, there is little doubt that Roosevelt
actually committed the nation to war on the side of Great Brit-
ain two years prior to Pearl HarborO and that he probably
knew about Japan's plans to attack an American base yet did
nothing about it until after the blow was struck.5 1 Not only did
the President repeatedly give verbal support to the anti-Hitler
forces, he pushed the American people to the brink of war
through such actions as the call for the Lend-Lease Act, the oc-
cupation of Iceland, the Atlantic Charter, the use of convoys,
the September 1941 "shoot on sight" order against Nazi U-
boats, and the destroyer deal of 1940.52 William Stevenson's ac-
count of that period, A Man Called Intrepid, describes
Roosevelt's close cooperation with Great Britain, and how he
secretly took certain steps that can only be called acts of war.53
As for Japan, American policy makers had access to all se-
cret Japanese diplomatic messages after army cryptologists
broke the Japanese code in August 1940. It seems clear that
Roosevelt knew in late 1941 that an attack was imminent some-
where in the Pacific. Nevertheless, the commanders of the
American military bases were not alerted in time,5 4 and the
Pearl Harbor attack catapulted the United States into war with
Japan. That war quickly expanded to Germany, when Hitler
declared war on the United States. Perhaps, as many have ar-
gued, World War I was a "just" war5 5 if ever there was one.
49. 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670. The Supreme Court's deference to the Presi-
dent in times of armed conflict is the norm; the Prize Cases are not aberra-
tional. See generally C. RossrrER & R. LONGAKER, supra note 20.
50. See W. STEVENSON, A MAN CALLED INTREPID (1976).
51. See B. BARTLETT, COVER-up: THE POLITICS OF PEARL HARBOR, 1941-1946
(1979).
52. See E. CoRwin, supra note 17, at 227-62 (ch. VI) (summary of President
Roosevelt's actions).
53. W. STEVENSON, supra note 50, passim.
54. See B. BARTLETT, supra note 51.
55. This is not to say that all actions taken by the Allies were "just." Cer-
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That, however, is not the point; the relevant fact is that the
President followed pagan principles well in advance of a decla-
ration of war. What Lincoln had done soon after fighting began
at Fort Sumter, Roosevelt did before December 7, 1941. The re-
sult, for present purposes, is clear- however much judges and
others may believe to the contrary, a written constitution is no
barrier to the desires of a determined Chief Executive (and a
pliable Congress).
Nor was the Constitution a barrier during World War II, as
evinced-to cite only one example-by Roosevelt's demand
that Congress repeal a provision of the Price Control Act of
1942, asserting that if Congress did not do so he, as President,
would be left "with an inescapable responsibility to the people
of this country to see to it that the war effort is no longer im-
periled by threat of economic chaos."5 6 That is as clear a state-
ment of raison d'etat as has ever been uttered by an American
President. Other examples of action taken by Roosevelt that
evidence raison d'etat include (a) imposing a nondiscrimina-
tion-in-employment clause in all war contracts;5 7 (b) forcibly
removing and incarcerating more than 100,000 people-includ-
ing many native-born citizens-of Japanese ancestry;5 8 (c)
hanging General Yamashita for war crimes even though the ev-
idence showed that Yamashita neither ordered nor knew about
the actions of his troops in the Philippines;59 (d) executing sev-
eral of the so-called Nazi saboteurs6 0 even in the face of Ex
parte Milligan;6l and (e) establishing many offices without
congressional approval-for example, the Office of War Infor-
mation.6 2 And when President Truman took office, he ordered
the use of atomic bombs even though it seemed obvious that
Japan was defeated. By the end of the war, presidential action
by reason of state had become almost commonplace.
tainly the bombing of Dresden was not, nor was the use of atomic weapons
against Japan. See generally M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977).
56. President's Message to Congress on Inflation Control, H.R. Doc. No.
834, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CONG. REC. 7042, 7044 (1942). See E. CORWIN, TOTAL
WAR AND THE CONSTrrTON (1946).
57. See Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REv. 27 (1955).
58. These actions were litigated and upheld. See Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). But
see Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (War Relocation Authority
held to have no authority to detain "citizens who are concededly loyal.").
59. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
60. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
61. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
62. See E. CoRwiN, supra note 17, at 239-50.
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3. Korea and Vietnam
It is doubtful whether President Roosevelt could have ob-
tained a declaration of war against either Japan or Germany
before the attack at Pearl Harbor. It is thus not surprising that
the President took extraconstitutional actions to achieve what
he probably would have been unable to achieve through more
formal constitutional processes. He perceived a need and acted
upon it-in accordance with basic Machiavellian principles.
Korea and Vietnam were similar in that the decisions to enter
those conflicts were largely made by the President, who also
supplied the interpretation that American intervention was
necessary. President Truman, for example, introduced Ameri-
can troops into Korea on his own authority and without con-
sulting Congress.6 3 Despite President Truman's assessment of
the need for American entry into Korea, some doubt exists as
to the necessity of that involvement.6 4 Reason of state again
prevailed. For the first time, a major external conflict was en-
tered into solely on presidential order, a conflict that did not
even remotely threaten American lives or property. Congress,
of course, approved the action; appropriations and other sup-
portive statutes were routinely enacted.
The importance of Korea for the development of presiden-
tial power cannot be over-emphasized. Previous external
forays by American military forces in the absence of declara-
tions of war were far smaller and far more localized. The State
Department issued a statement arguing that the President's ac-
tions in Korea were fully consonant with his legal authority.
Relying principally on "inherent" powers of the Chief Execu-
tive, but drawing also on the United Nations Charter and a U.N.
Security Council resolution, the State Department asserted
that the President has full control over the use of the armed
forces. "He also has authority to conduct the foreign relations
of the United States. Since the beginning of the United States
history, he has, on numerous occasions, utilized these powers
in sending armed forces abroad."65 The State Department ne-
63. See Longaker, The Constitution and the Commander in Chief After
1950, in C. ROSSITER & R. LONGAKER, supra note 20, at 135 n.1. See generally
Lofgren, Mr. Truman's War: A Debate and Its Aftermath, 31 REV. POL. 223, 231
(1969); Note, Congress, the Presiden4 and the Power to Commit Forces to Com-
bat, 81 HARv. L REV. 1771, 1791-92 (1968).
64. See Gittings, The War Before, The Guardian (Manchester), June 27,
1975, at 10.
65. Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEP'T STATE
Bum- 173-74 (1950). The State Department also noted that there was a "tradi-
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glected to say, however, that the President had never before
used such powers to the extent that they were employed in Ko-
rea. The scope of the presidential powers took a quantum
leap-his prerogative was completed several months later
when Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Congress: "Not
only has the President the authority to use the Armed Forces
in carrying out the broad foreign policy of the United States
and implementing treaties, but it is equally clear that this au-
thority may not be interfered with by Congress in the exercise
of powers which it has under the Constitution."66 That testi-
mony, in sum, is an assertion of reason of state run riot.
At the same time as its activities in Korea, the United
States became involved in Indochina-first by recognizing
French sovereignty over the area in May 1945,67 then by provid-
ing financial assistance to the French puppet regime beginning
in May 1950,68 later by sending advisers, and finally by commit-
ting more than 500,000 troops in what eventually proved to be a
futile effort. Presidents Johnson and Nixon maintained that
presidential power alone was sufficient to support such activi-
tional power of the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States
without consulting Congress." Id. at 174.
66. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, S. REP.
No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 797].
67. During World War II, President Roosevelt opposed post-war resump-
tion of French sovereignty over Indochina. On March 15, 1945, he indicated that
he would agree to a French trusteeship if the French would promise to promote
the eventual complete independence of Indochina. Memorandum of Conversa-
tion Between President Roosevelt and Charles Taussig, in 1 DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1945, at 124 (1967), reprinted
in 1 VIET-NAM CRISIS: A DOcUMENTARY HISTORY 32-33 (W. Cameron ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as VIET-NAM CRISIS]. See also A. WEDEMEYER, WEDEMEYER
REPORTS! 340 (1958) (Roosevelt's March 1945 support for independence of
French Indochina). Soon after Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, the Ameri-
can position seemed to become more passive and was subsequently marked by
acquiescence in French exercise of sovereignty, see Telegram from Acting Sec-
retary of State Joseph Grew to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, in 6 DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, supra, at 307, reprinted in 1 VIET-NAM CRISIS, supra, at 36 (quoting
statement of Secretary of State Edward Stettinius to French Minister for For-
eign Affairs Georges Bidault prior to May 9, 1945), refusal to provide active aid,
and continued urging of French promotion of Indochinese self-government or
independence. See 1 THE PENTAGON PAPERS: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HIS-
TORY OF UNITED STATES DECISIONMAKING ON VIETNAM 15-34 (Sen. Gravel ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PENTAGON PAPERS].
68. On May 1, 1950, President Truman approved $10 million in military
assistance for Indochina. See 1 PENTAGON PAPERS, supra note 67, at 66. Secre-
tary of State Acheson made a public announcement of economic and military
aid to Indochina and France on May 8. See Statement by Secretary of State
Acheson, United States Aid to the Associated States (May 8, 1950), in 2 DEPART-
MENT OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POUCY 1950-1955: BASIC DOCUMENTS 2365
(1957), reprinted in 1 VIET-NAM CRISIS, supra note 67, at 148.
[Vol. 64.585
CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL
ties. 69 It is not the purpose of this Article to assess American
involvement in Vietnam. That involvement is too recent to do
more than suggest several lessons it illustrates for constitu-
tional government.
One such lesson was described by Justice Robert Jackson
in his dissent in the Korematsu case: "If the people ever let
command of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscru-
pulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its restraint.
The chief restraint upon those who command the physical
forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their
69. President Johnson, in a news conference on August 18, 1967, claimed
that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was unnecessary: "We stated then, and we
repeat now, we did not think the resolution was necessary to do what we did
and what we're doing." N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1967, at 10, col. 6. See also S. REP.
No. 797, supra note 66, at 21-23.
President Nixon also took a sweeping view of presidential authority to de-
ploy American combat troops. In November 1973, Congress adopted the War
Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), over Nixon's veto. See
119 CONG. REC. 36202, 36222 (1973). One provision of the Resolution generally
requires that the President terminate any use of military forces within sixty
days if Congress has not authorized continued use of such forces. War Powers
Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(b), 87 Stat. 555, 556 (1973). In President
Nixon's veto message, he asserted that this provision was "clearly unconstitu-
tional" because the powers thus restricted-introducing the United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or combat troops into foreign countries-were
constitutional powers, "which the President has properly exercised under the
Constitution for almost 200 years." Message from President Nixon to the
House of Representatives, Oct. 24, 1973, H.R. Doc. No. 171, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
119 CONG. REC. 34990. Following the adoption of the resolution over Nixon's
veto, the White House refused to state whether it would obey the statute. See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 8. In 1976, President Nixon further elaborated
his concept of presidential power. "It is quite obvious that there are certain in-
herently governmental actions which if undertaken by the sovereign in protec-
tion of the interest of the nation's security are lawful but which if undertaken
by private persons are not .... [I]t is naive to attempt to categorize activities a
president might authorize as 'legal' or 'illegal' without reference to the circum-
stances under which he concludes that the activity is necessary." 4 SENATE SE-
LECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 755,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 755].
President Ford's views of the presidential military powers were similar to
those of Presidents Johnson and Nixon. He justified the United States Marines'
assault on the Cambodian island of Koh Tang and other offensive military ac-
tion related to the Mayaguez incident as "ordered and conducted pursuant to
the President's constitutional Executive power and his authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief." President's Letter to the Speaker of the House and Presi-
dent Pro Tempore of the Senate in Accordance With the War Powers
Resolution, 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 515, 516 (May 15, 1975). See also
A.S. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A NUTSHELL 192-94 (1977); Paust, The
Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774 (1976); Note, The Con-
stitutional Implications of the Mayaguez Incident, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 301
(1976). See generally Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of For-
eign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 463 (1976).
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responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporar-
ies and to the moral judgments of history."70 I suggest that the
war power did indeed fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous
hands during the Vietnam "war."7 '
Another lesson was described by Machiavelli: it is "a
sound maxim that reprehensible actions may be justified by
their effects, and.., when the effect is good.., it always jus-
tifies the action."72 In Vietnam, however, the American goal
was dominion over Southeast Asia7a-a goal that was bad
under both the pagan and the Judeo-Christian morality. The
means employed in Vietnam, therefore, cannot be justified,
even under Machiavelli's formula.
The significance of Vietnam for constitutional scholars can-
not be overestimated. The fundamental law was neatly
amended by presidential fiat; that amendment was approved by
a supine Congress and determination of its validity was
avoided by a timid judiciary. As Professor Richard P. Longaker
has correctly observed, "[T]he presidential position was that
while any formal support that Congress might wish to extend
in a given instance would be welcomed, the independent power
of the executive was sufficient."74 Such a position means that
the Executive Branch considers itself dominant in theory and
in fact-not primus inter pares,7 5 but simply primus.
John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Civil Government, de-
70. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting).
71. Compare M. WALZER, supra note 55, with W. SHAWCROSS, SmESHOW:
KISSINGER, NIXON AND THE DESTRUCnON OF CAMBODIA (1979). Shawcross dem-
onstrates that the bombing of Cambodia was not a mistake but a crime. Profes-
sor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University concludes: "Among the casualties
of the disaster we must count not only the Cambodians but America's own con-
stitutional order. Shawcross reminds us that the original bombing was not
merely concealed but falsified in the official records. Efforts by journalists to
'leak' the truth led to the wiretapping of top officials. Spying and dissimulation
between government agencies became routine. Attempts by the staff of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to investigate in Cambodia were
sabotaged. And yet the House Judiciary Committee refused to include Cambo-
dia among the articles of Nixon's impeachment" Hoffmann, The Crime of Cam-
bodia, N.Y. Rev. of Books, June 28, 1979, at 3, 4. For arguments in support of
the Nixon-Kissinger policy in Indochina, see H. KISSINGER, WHrrE HOUSE
YEARS (1979), critically reviewed by Hoffmann in N.Y. Rev. of Books, Dec. 8,
1979, at 14.
72. THE DIscOURSES, supra note 12, bk. I, § 9. The word "justified" might
better have been translated as "excused."
73. The oft-announced goal of bringing democracy to that area is sheer
nonsense and mere propaganda.
74. Longaker, supra note 63, in C. RossrrxR & R. LONGAKEP, supra note 20,
at 137.
75. The first among equals.
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fended use of the "prerogative" through the ancient principle
salus populi suprema lex:76 "This power to act according to
discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the
law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called the
prerogative .... There is a latitude left to the executive power,
to do many things of choice, which the laws do not prescribe."77
Well and good, one might say, were it not for two stubborn
facts: the Constitution of 1787 contains no provision for such
discretion in Vietnam the essential interests of the American
people were not in jeopardy. No crisis existed except one that
was manufactured by American policy makers. Although it is
unquestionably true that presidents must act in the face of ac-
tual crisis, they also labor under the obligation of correctly dis-
tinguishing between actual and chimerical crises. Their
analyses must be accepted, as Justice Jackson said, both by
their contemporaries and by posterity. A president who wishes
to avoid serious challenge to the legitimacy of his acts must
take care that his acts produce successful results. He labors
under the obligation to succeed. Machiavelli maintained that
"reprehensible actions" could be justified by "their effects. '7 8
Presidential actions in Vietnam were thus widely condemned
because the consequences of the American involvement were
bad by any criterion. It is instructive to compare Vietnam with
two other military episodes of dubious propriety: the war
against Mexico and the Spanish-American War. Both wars
were perceived as successful and, even though many people
firmly opposed such imperialistic adventures, they are not cur-
rently viewed with great opprobrium.
B. OTHER HISTORICAL ExAmPLEs
Enough has been said about the use of violence, in de-
clared wars and otherwise, to validate the existence of Berlin's
two moralities-one of pretense and the other of action-and to
show that at times even the pagan morality is transgressed.
Other examples help complete the argument that raison d'etat
is indeed a viable principle of American constitutional law.
76. The welfare of the people is the supreme law.
77. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT para. 160, at 80
(J. Gough ed. 1946). See Hurtgen, The Case for Presidential Prerogative, 7 U.
ToL L. REV. 59 (1975).
78. THE DIscouRsEs, supra note 12, bk. I, § 9.
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1. Economic Depression
Throughout its history, the United States has experienced
cyclical economic fluctuations. The economic system, loosely
called capitalism, is based primarily on private ownership and
control of production and distribution. For whatever reason,
those who control private enterprise have never been able to
achieve a stable economy. Destitution has periodically swept
the country. Not until the 1930s did the government attempt to
systematically remedy the causes of economic distress. In the
view of President Roosevelt, the Great Depression called for
crisis (warlike) techniques to meet a critical danger to the na-
tion. He proposed "not prudence, but the deliberate assump-
tion of risks in the hope of great gains." 79 Roosevelt pursued
such a policy by acting as economic dictator in the early days
of his first administration. During that period, he was the gov-
ernment of the United States. Raison d'etat was introduced to
economic affairs.
In his first inaugural address, Roosevelt asked for broad
emergency powers: "as great as the power that would be given
to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe."80 This was a
request for delegated powers. But the President did not wait
for Congressional authorization. On March 6, 1933 (two days af-
ter his inauguration and three days before Congress was sum-
moned in emergency session), Roosevelt, referring to the
existence of a national emergency, ordered a "bank holiday,"81
forbade the export of gold and silver, and prohibited transac-
tions in foreign exchange. His purported authority was a dubi-
ous reading of the Trading with the Enemy Act,82 a World War I
measure aimed at foreign exchange matters. His authority in
fact was reason of state. Congress' speedy ratification of these
actions (on March 9), which gave the President even greater
authority, does not belie the fact that Roosevelt's actions were
contrary to the law.
During the famous "Hundred Days" following March 4,
1933, Roosevelt and Congress acted so closely together that
Congress appeared to merely rubber-stamp executive actions.
Separation of powers was all but forgotten. The chasm be-
79. G. JOHNSON, ROOSEVELT: DICTATOR OR DEMOCRAT? 214 (1941).
80. 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 65
(1938).
81. Id. at 24-26. See Watkins, The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship,
in 1 PuBUc PoLicy 324 (C. Friedrich & E. Mason eds. 1940).
82. Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44
(App. 1976)).
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tween the two political branches of government was bridged,
but only for a short time. By 1935 there was growing opposition
to Roosevelt's policies in Congress, fed by the antagonism of
various interest groups. Finally, the Supreme Court began to
invalidate New Deal legislation. Prominent among the statutes
that were found unconstitutional was the National Recovery
Act,83 which had declared a national emergency and had
overtly delegated governing power to industrial groups. As is
common knowledge, however, the Court "rewrote" the due
process and interstate commerce clauses in 1937,84 thereby per-
mitting the political branches to freely manage the economy.
The abdication of judicial control over the economy, however, is
only operative when the President and Congress agree. That is
the lesson to be drawn from the Steel Seizure Case85 of 1952,
and AFL-CIO v. Kahn,8 6 a case in which the D.C. Circuit found
that Congress had impliedly granted the President power to
deny government contracts to companies that do not comply
with presidentially promulgated voluntary wage and price stan-
dards. When, on July 2, 1979, the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari in the Kahn case,87 the lesson became even more clear.
2. Dissident Groups
The dissident, notwithstanding the mythology to the con-
trary, has never been easily accepted in the United States.
Only when dissent takes innocuous forms-for example,
Thoreau at Walden Pond-is the person tolerated. The dissi-
dent has usually been controlled through purposive use of law
and the legal system. Radicals and deviants, with some excep-
tions, are seldom shot down, and they are rarely victims of
"emergency" legislation. The process is much more subtle:
they are enjoined by judges appointed always from among the
83. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414 (1935).
84. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (due process);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (interstate commerce).
The history of this constitutional reversal is described in A.S. MILLER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPrrALISM (1968). See also Shapiro, The Con-
stitution and Economic Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTrrurON OF THE UNTrED
STATES 74 (M. Harmon ed. 1978).
85. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
86. No. 79-0802 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
3107 (1979).
87. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 99 S. Ct. 3107 (1979). Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall would have granted certiorari. Id.
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Establishment;88 congressional and state legislative committees
inquire into their actions; and at times they receive an out-
wardly lawful, but actually political, trial and are convicted of
criminal activity. Examples are abundant. In 1920 a man in
Connecticut was jailed for six months for saying that "Lenin
was 'the brainiest' or 'one of the brainiest' political officers in
the world."8 9 In North Carolina during the 1970s several civil
rights advocates were arrested, convicted on trumped-up
charges, and given lengthy prison sentences.9 0 "[T]he hidden
underbelly of American politics," says Professor Murray Levin,
is "[t] he deeply felt intolerance that springs from our intense
commitment to Americanism, the irrational and compulsive
need to defend the assumptions of John Locke and Adam
Smith, the anti-Semitism, the nativism, the antiintellectualism,
the vigilantism, the racism, the Xenophobia, the pursuit of self-
interest under the guise of superpatriotism, and the profound
antiradicalism that can be observed 'in extremis' during the
hysteria [of such matters as the Red Scare of 1919-20 and Mc-
Carthyism,] have always been and are today the working as-
sumptions of millions of Americans." 91 Repression of
dissidents is not an aberration; it is as American as apple pie.
When repression is challenged in court, the result is likely
to be similar to the result in Barenblatt v. United States.92 Bar-
enblatt, a witness before the House Un-American Activities
Committee, was sentenced to six months in prison for refusal
to answer questions about his association with the Communist
88. See Miller, The Politics of the American Judiciary, 49 PoL. Q. 200
(1978). See also J. GRIFFH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (1977).
89. M. LEVIN, Po cAL HYSTERIA IN AMERICA 28 (1971). See Goldstein, An
American Gulag? Summary Arrest and Emergency Detention of Political Dissi-
dents in the United States, 10 COLUM. HUMAN RiGHTs L. REV. 541 (1978).
90. This is the case of Rev. Chavis and the civil rights advocates.
91. M. LEVIN, supra note 89, at 9.
92. 360 U.S. 109 (1959). Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court is demon-
strably faulty. As Dean Roscoe Pound said: "When it comes to weighing or val-
uing claims or demands with respect to other claims or demands, we must be
careful to compare them on the same plane. If we put one as an individual in-
terest and the other as a social interest we may decide the question in advance
in our very way of putting it." Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L
REV. 1, 2 (1943). That is precisely what Harlan did in Barenblatt: he balanced
Barenblatt's interest in remaining silent against a public interest in Congress'
knowledge about subversive activities. Correct answers require correct ques-
tions. The proper comparison in Barenblatt would have been between the com-
mon interest in a society free from harassment of individuals because of their
associations and a society in which possible subversion is more readily de-
tected.
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Party.93 In his majority opinion, Justice Harlan found that "the
balance between the individual and the governmental interests
here at stake must be struck in favor of the latter."94 "In the
last analysis," he explained, Congress' power "rests on the
right of self-preservation, 'the ultimate value of any society[.]'
... Justification for its exercise in turn rests on the long and
widely accepted view that the tenets of the Communist Party
include the ultimate overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence, a view which has been
given formal expression by the Congress." 95 That is an exam-
ple of raison d'etat solidified into constitutional doctrine;96
moreover, Barenblatt and Dennis v. United States97 are forms
of officially sanctioned thought control. The aim, no doubt
unarticulated, is to purify people's thoughts; or, at the very
least, to discourage people from associating with those whose
thoughts are considered to be impure.98 In sum, the Supreme
Court is not now, nor has it ever been, a barrier to the use of
reason of state against dissidents as determined by the political
officers of government.
3. Alleged Espionage
Two recent governmental actions involving foreign espio-
nage further illustrate the magnitude of the power exercised by
the State. The first example is the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Halkin v. Helms,99 in which Judge
Roger Robb held that the "state secrets" privilege is absolute
and, therefore, that American citizens cannot complain to
courts about their overseas telephone and telegraph messages
93. 360 U.S. at 113-14. Barenblatt refused to rely on his privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 114 & n.3.
94. Id. at 134.
95. Id. at 127-28 (citation omitted).
96. Justice Harlan, wittingly or not, was adopting a Machiavellian princi-
ple: "It is not the well-being of individuals that make cities great, but the well-
being of the community." THE DiscouIsEs, supra note 12, bk. II, § 2. Further
"the common good can be realized in spite of those few who suffer." Id. The
history of reason of state in the United States is one of a relative few suffering
for the putative common good.
97. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The petitioners in Dennis were convicted under the
Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976), for conspiring to organize the Communist
Party to teach the overthrow of the government of the United States by force
and violence.
98. But see 341 U.S. at 582-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting); D. WISE, THE AMERI-
cAN PoLacE STATE: THE GovERNmENT AGAINST THE PEOPLE (1976). See also A.
WoLFE, THE SEAMY SIDE OFI DEMOCRACY: REPRESSION IN AMERICA (1973); POLrr-
ICAL TRIALS 134-247 (T. Becker ed. 1971).
99. 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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being intercepted and read by American intelligence agen-
cies. 100 The second example is President Carter's Executive
Order of January 24, 1978, concerning the intelligence commu-
nity. "The order contains the most explicit and far reaching
claim of an inherent presidential right to intrude without a war-
rant into areas protected by the Fourth Amendment ever stated
by an American President."'01 Section 2-201(b) of the Order
reads:
Activities described in sections 2-202 through 2-205 for which a war-
rant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement rather than
intelligence purposes shall not be undertaken against a United States
person.without a judicial warrant, unless the President has authorized
the type of activity involved and the Attorney General has both ap-
proved the particular activity and determined that there is probable
cause to believe that the United States person is an agent of a foreign
power.102
The term "agent of a foreign power" is not defined, and the Ex-
ecutive Order specifically permits implementing directives to
be classified "because of the sensitivity of the information and
its relation to national security." 0 3
Carter's Executive Order has not yet been tested in the
courts. The few decisions that have dealt with foreign intelli-
gence, however, have not sustained warrantless searches. If
the President prevails here, an exponential jump in executive
power will have occurred. The import of Halkin v. Helms and
the Executive Order is clean in matters concerning alleged for-
eign espionage, reason of state prevails. Again, the Constitu-
tion will have been neatly amended. The cost, however, is high:
individual rights and liberties are diluted. Nevertheless, the in-
cantation of the magic words "national security" has thus far
usually been enough to justify these extra-constitutional ac-
tions. 0 4 One can hope, with little expectation that the hope
will be fulfilled, that the Supreme Court will cut through this
mass of verbiage and enforce the Constitution.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Halperin, The Carter Executive Order. A "Foreign Agent" Exception to
the Fourth Amendment, 3 FIRST PRINCIPLES, Feb. 1978, at 1, 3. Cf. S. REP. No.
755, supra note 69 (the 1976 views of President Nixon).
102. United States Intelligence Activities, Exec. Order No. 12,036, § 2-201(b),
3 C.F.R. 112, 126 (1979).
103. Id. § 4-106, 3 C.F.R. at 133.
104. See M. HALPERIN & D. HoFFmAN, FREEDOM VS. NATIONAL SEcuarrY
(1977). See also United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
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4. Evacuation of People
Still another example of raison d'etat may be seen in the
forced evacuation of people. The internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War II has been previously noted.105
Two other instances-the removals of the residents of the is-
lands of Bikini and Diego Garcia-indicate that such activity
was not an isolated episode.
When the United States decided in the late 1940s to test
atomic weapons, one of the testing sites chosen was the atoll of
Bikini, far from American territory. The residents of Bikini
were forcibly removed and relocated hundreds of miles away;
all this was done under the pretext of national security. To this
date, lasting radioactive after-effects prevent these people from
returning to their homes.106 The Diego Garcia incident is less
well known. A spit of land in the Indian Ocean, once under
British sovereignty, Diego Garcia became a military base for
the .United States in the 1970s. First, however, the people who
lived there had to be evacuated and relocated against their will.
Those former residents who are still alive now reside in misera-
ble slums on Mauritius. 0 7
105. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. An additional example is
the series of forced removals of American Indians, see note 37 supra. In the
1838 removal of the Cherokee Nation to Oklahoma, 4,000 of 17,000 Cherokees
died. See L. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 16-14 at 1013-14. See generally G. FLEisCH-
MANN, THE CHEROKEE REMOVAL, 1838 (1971); G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL
(1932).
106. See generally N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1979, at 47, col. 1; id., Oct. 17, 1975, at
70, col. 1.
107. Discussion of the Diego Garcia incident may be found in Diego Garcia,
1975: The Debate Over the Base and the Island's Former Inhabitants: Hearings
Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hear-
ings]. See also COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT No. B-
184915, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE AvAnAI Y
OF CERTAIN INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES (1976); N.Y. Times,
Dec. 25, 1975, at 8, col. 2.
A 1966 agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom
made the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory, including the Chagos
Archipelago, available to both countries for defense purposes. See Agreement
on the Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes, Dec.
30, 1966, United States-United Kingdom, 18 U.S.T. 28, T.I.A.S. No. 6196. When
the United States decided to establish a facility on Diego Garcia, an island of
the Archipelago, the British, pursuant to the Agreement, carried out the evacu-
ation that was considered necessary. The inhabitants of the island were con-
tract workers on a coconut plantation, some from families that had resided on
the island for generations. In 1964 there were 483 people on the island, about
half of whom were considered to be "Ilois"-oriented more towards the Chagos
Archipelago than their ancestral Mauritius or Seychelles. See U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, REPORT ON THE RESETTLEMENT OF INHABITANTS OF THE CHAGOS ARCHI-
PELAGO, 121 CONG. REC. 33124, 33124 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STATE DEPART-
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The conclusion is clear: when considered desirable, the
United States government will remove people against their will
in order to further "national security." Again, that is raison
d'etat. Whether it was in fact indispensable to our security to
explode atomic weapons at Bikini or confiscate the property of
the people on Diego Garcia is doubtful, and does not appear to
have been adequately considered by American officials.
5. Raison de Groupe
It has been suggested above that the United States is a
form of corporate State, a syzygetic order in which corporations
and government coexist.108 If that is indeed so, then raison
d'etat must also encompass a dimension of raison de groupe.0 9
Several examples illustrate this point.
The involvement of the United Fruit Company (U.F.) in
Central America shows that the company was the defacto gov-
ernment of several nations for years-with the full knowledge
and support of the United States government." 0 U.F. won its
MENT REPORT], reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra, at 40-45. The establishment
of the base was expected to occupy the land on which the plantation was lo-
cated, requiring closure of the plantation. See 1975 Hearings, supra, at 72 (testi-
mony of George T. Churchill, Director, Office of International Security
Operations, Dep't of State). The islanders were thus removed primarily be-
cause of their loss of the means of economic support. In addition, the U.S. was
concerned about security in the vicinity of a military installation and the possi-
ble social problems that might be caused by contact between the military per-
sonnel and the natives. See id., at 74 (testimony of George T. Churchill); STATE
DEPARTMENT REPORT, 121 CONG. REC. at 33124 (no mention of a need for the
plantation's land). The plantation closure made it impossible for the islanders
to avoid resettlement and most were removed to Mauritius in 1971. The Mauri-
tian government, at least through 1975, did little to assist the adjustment of the
islanders, who were largely untrained for local jobs, and many of whom were
forced to live in slum housing. From among the islanders, many of whom reset-
tled in 1973 from the other two Chagos Archipelago islands, about 40 had died
by 1975, primarily from influenza and diphtheria. See Walker, Price on Island-
ers' Birthright, The Guardian (Manchester & London), Nov. 4, 1975, at 4, col. 2,
reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra, at 122-23; Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1975, at 1, col. 2,
reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra, at 102-04.
108. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
109. Carl Friedrich speaks of "reason of church," see C. FRIEDRICH, supra
note 8, at 6, and suggests that reason of state need not be limited to the State.
Id. at 127.
110. See T. McCANN, AN AMERICAN COMPANY: THE TRAGEDY OF UNITED
FRUIT (1976). See also R. HEILBRONER, M. MINTz, C. MCCARTHY, S. UNGAR, K.
VANDIVIER, S. FRIEDMAN & J. BOYD, IN THE NAME OF PROFIT (1972); L. SILK & D.
VOGEL, ETHIcs AND PROFITS (1976). For an account of how Chisso Corporation
of Japan poisoned fishing waters but did nothing about it for years, see W. & A.
SMITH, MINIMATA (1975). See also Dowie, The Corporate Crime of the Century, 4
MOTHER JONES, Nov. 1979, at 23; Developments in the Law)-Corporate Crime:
Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV.
1227 (1979).
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way by force, bribery, and political subversion, all with the ac-
quiescence and often with the cooperation of the State Depart-
ment and the United States' military forces. In effect, the U.S.
and U.F. acted in concert. The Central Intelligence Agency
even used U.F. ships in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Major General
Smedley D. Butler (Commander of the Marines) put the situa-
tion in colorful terms in 1935:
I spent thirty-three years and four months in active service as a mem-
ber of our country's most agile military force-the Marine Corps....
And during that period I spent most of my time being a high-class mus-
cle man for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the bankers. In
short, I was a racketeer for capitalism .... Thus I helped make Mexico
and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped
make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to
collect revenues in .... I helped purify Nicaragua for the international
banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I brought light to the
Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped
make Honduras "right" for the American fruit companies in 1903. In
China I helped see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested.111
The bitter fruit of those decades of American intervention on
the behalf of totalitarian regimes and their American corporate
supporters is now being reaped in Nicaragua and other Latin-
American nations.
Domestic industry in the nineteenth century, like interna-
tional business, grew increasingly powerful and was able to ac-
quire government protection against the rising demands of the
working class. Corporate managers, aided by their minions in
government, took advantage of an oversupply of labor. At the
time, they were able, through both fair and foul methods, to de-
feat the growing labor movement. One historian, Richard Les-
ter, concluded in 1947: "During the depression from 1873 to
1879, employers sought to eliminate trade unions by a system-
atic policy of lock-outs, blacklists, labor espionage, and legal
prosecution. The widespread use of blacklists and Pinkerton
labor spies caused labor to organize more or less secretly, and
undoubtedly helped bring on the violence that characterized la-
bor strife during this period."112 When labor was able to per-
suade legislatures to pass minimum wage and maximum hour
legislation, most of those laws were promptly struck down by a
111. S. LENS, THE FORGING OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 270-71 (1971) (quoting
an article by Major General Butler in the November 1935 issue of Common
Sense). Corporations often define the axioms of American foreign policy. It is
axiomatic, for example, for government to protect American property abroad.
That is what General Butler was doing-protecting the property of American
corporations.
112. R. LESTER, ECONOMICS OF LABOR 545 (1947) (emphasis added), quoted
in 2 THE UNDERSIDE OF AMERICAN HISTORY 13 (T. Frazier ed. 1971).
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Supreme Court that operated as "the first authoritative faculty
of political economy in the world's history."113 The Court not
only discovered that the corporation was a person under the
Constitution, but it also invented the concept of substantive
due process." 4
Since this conduct is familiar enough, it needs no elabora-
tion. The point is simple: Corporations pursued selfish goals
and were aided by government. The brutal repression of the
Industrial Workers of the World, by both federal and state offi-
cials, supplies ample testimony to that point. So, too, does the
decision of In re Debs,"5 which upheld federal intervention in
the Pullman strike.
C. SUMMARY
Machiavellianism has indeed been a consistent part of
American public policy since the beginnings of the republic.
Franz Neumann was correct; government in the United States
has always been as strong as conditions required, conditions
that are perceived by those who wield effective power in the na-
tion. The conclusion should be clear: (a) the Constitution in
the nineteenth century was distinctly not one of limitations, de-
spite the popular wisdom to the contrary; (b) it is not hyper-
bole to apply the term "constitutional dictatorship," or
"democratic dictatorship," to the government of the United
States during circumstances it perceives as emergencies-
within the limits imposed by the Principle of the Economy of
Means;"6 (c) two divergent moralities-pagan and "Chris-
tian"-have always existed in the United States; (d) when con-
flicts occur between those two moralities, the pagan usually
prevails, making the dualism in constitutional law more appar-
ent than real; (e) some actions are evil under either morality,
giving some credence to Lord Acton's comment that
"[w]eighed in the scales of Liberalism, the instrument of the
Constitution, as it stood, was a monstrous fraud";" 7 (f) the
United States grew powerful and prosperous because extracon-
stitutional adjustments were made in the second constitution;
and (g) people generally do not object to exercises of raison
d'etat; rather, they tend to applaud such activities, thus lending
113. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 7 (1924).
114. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Ex-
humation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34.
115. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
116. See S. WOUN, PoLTICS AND VISION (1960). See also p. 589 supra.
117. J. ACTON, LECTURES ON MODERN HISTORY 295 (paperback ed. 1960).
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support to the view that the American people favor the pagan
morality.
Ill. THE CLIMACTERIC
Is the United States currently in a crisis or in a climac-
teric-a coalescence of crises? I suggest that we are in the lat-
ter. As a result, the future will not be a calm and ordered
existence, and there will be no steady progression toward a
better society or group of societies. The idea of progress, born
out of the Enlightenment, is dead.118
Humans face several vulnerabilities. Energy shortages are
currently the most obvious of these. But several others exist,
each one of such significance to be a crisis in itself. The vulner-
abilities of an industrialized nation such as the United States
include, but are not limited to, the following: the threat of ther-
monuclear warfare, nuclear proliferation, radiation health
hazards from widespread employment of nuclear technologies,
the population "bomb," food shortages, dependence on nonfuel
minerals, terrorism, inflation, unemployment (structural, be-
cause of the imminent application of microprocessing), social
disruptions," 9 and the psychological problem of a failure of
nerve-an inchoate belief that things are in a mess and will not
get better. Taken together, as they should be because of their
increasing coalescence, these vulnerabilities mark one of the
great turning points in human history.
Since we live, as Dr. Harrison Brown put it, "in a largely
synthetic ecological system, new in human experience and in-
adequately understood,"1 20 belief systems and behavior pat-
terns that are the products of eons of history must now be
employed in wholly novel situations. It is thus not surprising
that this is the "me generation," the "age of narcissism, 1 21 and
that the politics of selfishness are all-pervasive. But it does no
good to ask, as some have: "What has posterity done for me?"
For because of extraordinarily rapid social change, a recent de-
velopment, we are our own posterity. It is also not surprising
118. See L. BROWN, THE TWENTY-NInTH DAY (1978); W. JOHNSON, MUDDLING
TOwARD FRUGALITY (1978); G. STENT, THE COMING OF THE GOLDEN AGE: A VIEW
OF THE END OF PROGRESS (1969). A leading neoconservative blames intellectu-
als for an assault on progress itself. See Nisbet, The Rape of Progress, 2 PUB.
OPINION, June-July 1979, at 2. Nisbet does not identify any specific intellectuals.
119. See generally H. BROWN, THE HUMAN FUTURE REVISITED (1978).
120. Id. at 227.
121. C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISm passim (1979).
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that "Micawberism"122-the notion that sooner or later some-
thing will turn up to rescue man from his follies-is so preva-
lent.
In a previous Article, I suggested that this country "has
survived and prospered thus far, not because of the Constitu-
tion but in spite of it."123 Rufus E. Miles, Jr., stated the same
point in other terms: "The extraordinary affluence of the
United States has been produced by a set of fortuitous,
nonreplicable, and nonsustainable factors."'124 If that is true,
then surely Micawberism is a pathetic fallacy, and the politics
of selfishness will lead to disaster. The Constitution, even as a
politico-legal palimpsest, is not necessarily able to cope with in-
creasingly evident needs, as the multifarious facets of the cli-
macteric of humankind press harder and harder against
American institutions. The obvious requirement is for constitu-
tional change that will both enable people to deal effectively
with the burgeoning problems of the human condition and pre-
serve as many of the values of historical constitutionalism as
possible.
What those constitutional changes might be is one ques-
tion; what they should be is another. Neither issue, however, is
the subject of this Article. Rather, I should like to suggest that,
in the words of Dr. Lester Brown, "[t] here can be little doubt
that humanity is on the verge of a profound social transforma-
tion, at the edge of a new social frontier,"' 25 and that this has
immense significance for the Constitution. As a result, Ameri-
cans are moving into the era of the Constitution of Control.
IV. THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL
Any document that exists through time and is still consid-
ered to be an authoritative text takes on such a gloss of inter-
pretation, custom, and usage that its modern version has only a
tenuous relationship to the original. Exegesis, however, is not
confined to theological documents, such as the Bible. The
Christian religion has been able to absorb the insights of Co-
122. Micawberism, named after the character in Dickens' David Cop-
perfield, is particularly evident in those who believe that technological "fixes"
can extricate humankind from the climacteric now so evident. See, e.g., H.
KAHN, W. BROWN & L MARTEL, THE NExT 200 YEARS: A SCENARIO FOR AMERICA
AND THE WORLD (1976); Kahn & Phelps, The Economic Present and Future: A
Chartbook for the Decades Ahead, 13 THE FUTURIST 202 (1979).
123. Miller, Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39
OHIO ST. L.J. 736, 751 (1978).
124. R. MILES, supra note 32, at 224.
125. L. BROWN, supra note 118, at 324.
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pernicus and Darwin and Freud without outward alteration of
the ancient language-but with considerable change in its ap-
plication. In law and politics, even Soviet theoreticians have
had to apply a concept of "living Marxism" in order to explain
and justify new doctrine.126 It is not surprising, then, that the
second constitution has undergone immense alterations. Spe-
cific clauses have been interpreted in different ways at different
times; even structural changes have occurred-as in the demise
of "dual federalism" and the rise of executive hegemony in gov-
ernment. As noted above, Professor Corwin's label of a "Con-
stitution of Powers," which we have called the third American
fundamental law, is a translucent layer of doctrine and prac-
tice, which has been developed in the past fifty years. 27 The
Constitution of Control-the fourth constitution-exists as still
another overlay. More emergent than complete, its contours
are becoming obvious. This section outlines its development.
The text for what follows is taken from Justice Holmes's
dissenting opinion in Abrams. The Constitution, he said, is an
experiment, "as all life is an experiment. Every year if not
every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy
based upon imperfect knowledge.' 28 A comprehensive discus-
sion of the theory of the Constitution of Control is not within
the scope of this Article. Instead, some of its more prominent
features are discussed, with reference to some of the relevant
literature.
A. LAw AS A MEMORANDUM
Law, including constitutional law, is not a priori. Rather, it
is a reflection of the society in which it operates: a posteriori.
Or, as Emerson said, law is "only a memorandum."' 29 But of
what is law a memorandum?
We are living in the Technological Age, an obvious fact, but
126. See Kolakowski, Permanent and Transitory Aspects of Marxism, in
THE BROKEN MIRROR 157, 158-59. (P. Mayewski ed. 1958), quoted in C. FRANKEL,
THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT 189 (1962); V. LENIN, MARX, ENGELS, MARXISM 385-
86 (4th English ed. 1951) ("[TIhe incontestable truth is that a Marxist must
take cognizance of actual events, of the precise facts of reality, and must not
cling to a theory of yesterday, which, like all theories, at best only outlines the
main and general, and only approximates to an inclusive grasp of the complexi-
ties of life."). See also A.S. MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW:
AMERICA'S EVOLVING CONSTTUTION 343, 382 (1979) (reprinting Lenin's quote).
127. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
128. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).
129. R.W. Emerson, Politics, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 423 (Atkinson ed. 1940) (Modern Library edition).
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one too little considered in legal thought. Humankind is in the
midst of the greatest environmental changes in its history.
"There is little of importance in the world which does not de-
pend in some measure on technology, even in its most re-
stricted sense as man's mechanical means to his ends."130 Our
interest in technology lies not in what is accomplished in the
laboratory or production plant, although what happens there is
significant. Rather, we are interested in what effect the techno-
logical revolution has on politico-legal mechanisms-on law, on
constitutions, and on economic systems. Thus, attention must
be given to the following aspects of advanced technology:
1. The art of invention has itself been invented;
2. What is technologically possible will be done, sooner or
later;
3. Technology works toward the consolidation of political
power; it is centripetal, not centrifugal;
4. Technology has accelerated time;
5. Change is a social constant; and
6. A variety of techniques of control over human beings
now exist and are being used.
These self-evident factors should be common knowledge,
part of the "given" of ordinary discourse. Unfortunately, how-
ever, this is not so. Even though the United States is .the tech-
nological society par excellence, Americans, generally
speaking, unthinkingly accept the benefits (and suffer the detri-
ments) of technology without noticing technology's subtle ef-
fects on the quality of life; nor do they perceive the effects of
technology on the nature of the constitutional order. In briefly
examining some conclusions drawn from the impact of technol-
ogy, two of the above factors will be emphasized. First, as
Franz Neumann said, "[t]he higher the state of technological
development, the greater the concentration of political
power."13 1 And, second, technology now permits mass control
measures to be employed.
The first point requires little discussion. No doubt exists
that political and legal power in the United States has tended
to be consolidated almost from the beginnings of the Republic.
Chief Justice John Marshall's "nationalizing" decisions laid the
early groundwork for that development. Later, in the period af-
ter the Civil War, the influences of economics and technology
130. Watson-Watt, Technology in the Modern Worlds, in THE TECHNOLOGI-
CAL ORDER 1, 7 (C. Stover ed. 1963).
131. F. NEumANN, Supra note 1, at 10.
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combined to create, in Galbraith's terms, "the new industrial
state."132 A national economic system of giant corporations
was superimposed on a decentralized political system with
nexuses in each of the several states. Something had to give-
and it did. That "something" was traditional federalism, which
changed from "dual" to "cooperative" with the arrival of the
New Deal.133 The giant corporations began to supplant the
states in the federal system-their role became as important
as, or even more important than, that of the allegedly sovereign
states in providing a counterbalance to the power of Washing-
ton. Simultaneously, growth in the number and complexity of
the tasks of government led to the dominance of the Executive
(including the bureaucracy) within the tripartite division of
powers in the national government. Each branch might have
been, in Chief Justice Roger Taney's terms, "equal in origin
and equal in title,"134 but the Constitution of Powers meant
that the Executive Branch was, and will remain, preeminent.
At about the same time, something important happened in
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Rather than pursuing a "principled," conceptualistic approach
to decisionmaking, the Court overtly began to adopt a prag-
matic methodology of "interest-balancing"; in the resulting bal-
ances, the State's interest was always weighty. This had one
important consequence: the interests of the State became
avowedly dominant at precisely the time that government (the
apparatus of the State) began an exponential growth. The indi-
vidual was submerged in a congeries of bureaucracies, public
and private.
The rise of the bureaucratic State means that the balancing
system developed by the drafters of the Constitution of 1787
has gone awry. Far from "keeping power within tolerable
boundaries, the American system has encouraged power to go
underground." 35 The surface is one thing; there the formal in-
stitutions of public life block each other. The reality, however,
is different: beneath the surface are the "subgovernments" of
Washington,13 6 the informal methods by which important gov-
ernmental decisions are in fact reached. Political power is be-
coming increasingly centralized in the executive bureaucracies,
132. J. GALBRArrH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973); J. GAL-
BRAmTH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
133. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
134. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 701 (1864) (published 1885).
135. R. KRAEMER, A-ERiCAN DEMOCRACY: THE THIRD CENTURY 492 (1978).
136. See D. CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON (1964).
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independent fiefdoms, which operate within the Executive
Branch but which have close connections with industries that
they ostensibly regulate and with influential members of Con-
gress. There can be no doubt that power centralization exists.
The rise of the bureaucracy to power has made the agencies, as
Justice Jackson said in 1952, "a veritable fourth branch of the
Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theo-
ries much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our
three-dimensional thinking."137
A second, and quite different, consequence of technology is
the control of humans through ostensibly benign measures.
There can be little doubt that such control is already taking
place. In 1978, Peter Schrag observed:
In the past generation, there has been a fundamental shift in the way
government and other organizations control the lives and behavior of
individuals. No single method and no single phrase adequately de-
scribe it-it is both too subtle and too pervasive-but it represents a
radical change in the way people are treated and in the relationship be-
tween the citizen, his employer, the state, and the state's institutions.
In general, it is a shift from direct to indirect methods of control, from
the punitive to the therapeutic, from the moralistic to the mechanistic,
from the hortatory to the manipulative. More specifically, it is reflected
in the replacement of overt and sometimes crude techniques-threat,
punishment, or incarceration-with relatively "smooth" methods:
psychotropic drugs; Skinnerian behavior modification; aversive condi-
tioning electronic surveillance; and the collection, processing, and use
of personal information to institutionalize people outside the walls of
institutions. 138
The ideologist for this development is B.F. Skinner.139 The goal
is "predictable" man-a person who conceives of freedom in
Hegelian terms: doing what one is supposed to do.
My point, again, is not to document extensively such asser-
tions, but merely to indicate that the means of technological
control of people are not only present but they are being used,
and further, that there is a considerable body of respectable
thought that believes that those means should be used. Schrag
tells us that they are being used, thus exemplifying the notion
that whatever is technologically possible will be done.
The meaning for law and constitutions should be obvious.
Science and technology are slowly, subtly, and "humanely" re-
137. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., dissenting).
138. P. SCHRAG, MIND CONTROL xi (1978). See A. SCHEFLIN & E. OPTON, THE
MIND MANIPULATORS (1978). See also C. LASCH, supra note 121, at 154-86.
139. See, e.g., B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNIrY (1971).
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pealing the Constitution.140 Millions of Americans are being
subjected to behavior modification and control through the use
of law and the legal process for the newly emergent highest
good: the welfare of society.
An example is the use of computer technology to quietly
encroach upon fundamental rights such as privacy.141 Re-
cently, the "third industrial revolution"142 of microprocessing-
the "silicon chip revolution"--has enhanced the potential of
computers to be used as a means by which the behavior of peo-
ple can be monitored and controlled. Modern society is the "in-
formation society";143 he who controls the data controls society.
Privacy, no matter how much it may be desired, is becoming a
wasting asset and is disappearing in the new era of microelec-
tronics.144
Microprocessing will provide cheaper, smaller computers.
As a result, the use of computers in modern society will greatly
accelerate, simultaneously accelerating the danger to personal
freedoms inherent in a widespread capacity for interchangea-
ble data storage and retrieval. Increasingly, a person's record
follows him closely throughout life. In a large, continentally
sized nation such as the United States, developments such as
the National Crime Information Center and computerized crim-
inal history files145 can have many social benefits. But the cost
is high: use of such information systems leads to loss of pri-
vacy and, of more importance, diminution of human dignity.
The question for constitutional lawyers in the Age of Tech-
140. See P. SCHRAG, supra note 138, at 252-55. Aldous Huxley put the matter
in pungent terms:
We have had religious revolutions, we have had political, economic,
and nationalistic revolutions. All of them, as our descendants will dis-
cover, were but ripples in an ocean of conservatism-trivial by compar-
ison with the psychological revolution toward which we are so rapidly
moving. That will really be a revolution. When it is over, the human
race will give no further trouble.
A. SCHEFLIN & E. OPTON, supra note 138, at 10 (quoting Aldous Huxley).
141. In his opinion for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), Justice Douglas described privacy as a penumbral constitutional right,
implicitly emanating from the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484-85.
142. See C. JENKINS & B. SHERMAN, THE COLLAPSE OF WORK (1979).
143. See, e.g., I. BARRON & R. CuRNow, THE FuTuRE WrrT ELECTRONICS
(1979); ELECTRONICS: THE CONTrUING REVOLUIION (P. Abelson & A. Hammon
eds. 1977); Branscomb, Information: The Ultimate Frontier, 203 SCIENCE 143
(1979).
144. To a great extent, a person's name has become a number-his social
security number.
145. The Office of Technology Assessment, which services Congress, is con-
ducting a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the National Crime Infor-
mation Center (NCIC) and computerized criminal histories (CCH).
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nology is whether the values of constitutionalism can be pre-
served. On this question, the jury is still out, but the means for
control of people are available and if it is true that what is tech-
nologically possible will be done, then we will move into a
Skinnerian world, one in which Americans "will no longer
know, or care, whether they are being served or controlled,
treated or punished, or whether they are volunteers or con-
scripts. The distinctions will have vanished."' 4 6 This is a grim
scenario, to be sure, but one toward which technological imper-
atives are taking the nation and, indeed, people everywhere. If,
in sum, law is a reflection of society, then it cannot escape be-
ing vitally affected by the scientific-technological revolution
even more than it has been in the past.
B. THE STATE AS "GROUP-PERSON"
The major prophet for the emergent Constitution of Con-
trol is Thomas Hobbes, who in his classic Leviathan both gave
a name to the modern State and set forth its philosophy. Those
who would understand the United States under the Constitu-
tion of Control must first understand Hobbes, who was surely
as influential as Locke and Montesquieu were upon those who
wrote the Constitution of 1787. The framers were well aware of
the dark side of man. "[TI he theme of man's irrationality," Ar-
thur 0. Lovejoy maintained, "and especially of his inner cor-
ruption was no longer [during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries] a specialty of divines; it became for a time one of the
favorite topics of secular literature."'4 7 European and Ameri-
can political theorists came to emphasize the dangers rather
than the advantages of government. If a man was depraved
and antisocial, then he required control; but those who con-
trolled, themselves human beings, would mercilessly exploit
their subjects unless there was some way to limit their power.
In the words of James Madison: "If men were angels, no gov-
ernment would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be adminis-
tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the governed, and in
the next place oblige it to control itself."'48 Control over the
146. P. SCHRAG, supra note 138, at 255. See also W. OPHULs, ECOLOGY AND
THE POLITICS OF ScARCrrY: PROLOGUE TO A POLITIcAL THEORY OF THE STEADY
STATE (1977); W. THOMPSON, EVIL AND WORLD ORDER (1976).
147. A. LovEjoy, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE 15 (1961).
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison) (emphasis added).
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governed is well established; but will government control itself?
The answer is fast becoming "no." As it has been shown, it was
also "no" in the past, but only when certain extraordinary situ-
ations obtruded, situations in which political officers consid-
ered it necessary to draw upon the reserve powers of the
State.149
"Leviathan," says William Ophuls, "may be mitigated, but
not evaded."15 0 Hobbes advocated complete domination by the
State to prevent internal disorder and to protect against exter-
nal threats. Today, the Hobbesian world is fast emerging: Levi-
athan is being created-in Gierkian terms, a "super-group-
person" with drives and interests of its own that transcend the
sum of the private interests of the nation.15 1
Little attention has been accorded the nature of "the State"
in the literature on American constitutionalism. 5 2 Judges and
commentators alike have slid over analysis of the concept,
often blithely, but erroneously, equating the State with govern-
ment or with society. The terms are not synonymous, and
should not be considered as equivalents. Constitutional schol-
arship is flawed by the failure to probe deeply into the meaning
of the three terms-how they are used, by whom, and for what
purposes. The question, to be sure, is one of political theory,
but that should not inhibit legal analysis because it is widely
conceded that the Supreme Court, in its constitutional deci-
sions, articulates juristic theories of politics.
It has earlier been suggested that the United States has be-
come a "corporate State."' 53 The overarching social reality in
this nation is the State, an anthropomorphic group-person with
drives and interests of its own-an "organism," as Holmes
said.15 4 Of course, the State cannot be seen; it is a method, not
149. One of those reserve powers, of course, is reason of state. Another re-
serve power is the degree of presidential confidentiality recognized in United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
150. W. OPHuLs, supra note 146, at 163.
151. See the discussion in A.S. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE,
supra note 6. See also note 154 infra.
152. One has to turn to political theorists or to sociologists for discussions
of "the State." See, e.g., E. CASSIRER, THE M=-rx OF THE STATE (1946); A.
D'ENTREVES, THE MODERN NOTION OF THE STATE (1946); H. KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg trans. 1945); G. POGGI, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE MODERN STATE: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION (1978). A col-
league and I have essayed a few preliminary thoughts about the nature of the
State in modern separation of powers litigation. See Miller & Bowman, Presi-
dential Attacks on the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes: A New Separation
of Powers Problem, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 51, 60-74 (1979).
153. See A.S. MI.Ei.R, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE, supra note 6.
154. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). Judge Learned Hand once
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a thing. Like the business corporation, in law an artificial per-
son, the State exists in constitutional theory even though it has
"no anatomical parts to be kicked or consigned to the cala-
boose; no soul for whose salvation the parson may struggle; no
body to be roasted in hell or purged for celestial enjoyment."'- 5
The State, a legal fiction, does no act, thinks no thought, speaks
no word, but exists both to the extent that those who wield the
power in government speak for it and to the extent that men
may die and property may be seized in its name.
A little-noted, but important, court of appeals decision in
1978 illustrates this point. In Halkin v. Helms,'56 opponents of
the Vietnam "war" filed suit against several officials of the in-
telligence community, alleging that the National Security
Agency (NSA) conducted warrantless interceptions of their in-
ternational wire, cable, and telephone communications. Judge
Roger Robb, speaking for the panel, framed the issue in these
terms: "[S]hould the NSA be ordered to disclose whether in-
ternational communications of the plaintiffs have been ac-
quired by the NSA and disseminated to other federal
agencies?"157 NSA services the intelligence community by
electronically monitoring overseas communications. "Watch-
lists"-words and phrases identifying communications of intel-
ligence interest-are employed to isolate communications of
said that judges "called upon to pass on a question of constitutional law...
must be aware of the changing social tensions in every society which [make] it
an organism." Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1930).
Such an organismic conception of the State (often with the word used synony-
mously with government or society) is fundamental to an understanding of
American constitutional law. Compare these statements: "[G]overnment is
not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe,
but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton.
It is modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its func-
tions by the sheer pressure of life." W. WILSON, CONsTrrmoNAL GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908); President John F. Kennedy, in answering a
question about a "public interest" in collective bargaining negotiations: "These
companies are free and the unions are free. All we [the Executive] can try to
do is indicate to them the public interest which is there. After all, the public
interest is the sum of the private interests, or perhaps it's even sometimes a
little more. In fact, it is a little more." N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1962, at 14, col. 5 (em-
phasis added).
155. W. Hamilton, On the Composition of the Corporate Veil (1946), quoted
in P. EELLS & C. WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF BusINESS 132-33 (1961).
Hamilton was speaking about the corporation, but surely his remarks are also
applicable to the State.
156. 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir.
1978). See also Hayden v. National Security Agency, No. 78-1728 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
29, 1979) (NSA does not have to give public detailed explanation for refusal to
disclose documents sought under the Freedom of Information Act.).
157. 598 F.2d at 3.
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specific intelligence interest from the enormous numbers of for-
eign communications. Thus, in actuality, everyone's overseas
wire, cable, and telephone messages are monitored by the NSA.
Copies of all cables are sent to NSA by Western Union, RCA,
and IT.
One would think that message interceptions of all "commu-
nications having at least one foreign terminal" and watch-lists
of "approximately 1200 Americans"15 8 would present an obvi-
ous instance of police-state tactics wholly inimical to the Amer-
ican system of government. After all, the Supreme Court has
never authorized warrantless wiretaps, even for foreign intelli-
gence purposes, and lower federal courts that have dealt with
the question are split. The panel of judges in Halkin saw it
otherwise. In the words of Judge Robb:
A ranking of the various privileges in our courts would be a delicate
undertaking at best, but it is quite clear that the privilege to protect
state secrets must head the list. The state secrets privilege is absolute.
However helpful to the court the informed advocacy of the plaintiffs'
counsel may be, we must be especially careful not to order any dissem-
ination of information asserted to be privileged state secrets. 1 5 9
The court accepted the untested assertion of the Secretary
of Defense that "[c]ivil discovery or a responsive pleading...
would severely jeopardize the intelligence collection mission of
NSA by identifying present communications collection and
analysis capabilities."160 Not even in camera proceedings are
to be permitted. Paying "utmost deference" to the Execu-
tive,161 the court found that the interests of the State overrode
any interest of the individual. Even though "the" United
States, 162 as such, was not a party to the lawsuit, it nonetheless
was able to prevail. When Halkin is added to President
Carter's executive order authorizing sweeping presidential use
of warrantless wiretaps, 63 it becomes clear that an organismic
conception of the State is being reified by a series of official ac-
tions.1 64
This conclusion is buttressed by Judge Warren's prior-re-
straint injunction in United States v. The Progressive, Inc.165
There, for the first time in American history, a judge enjoined
158. Id. at 4.
159. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 4-5.
161. Id. at 9.
162. See Miller & Bowman, supra note 152.
163. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
164. See also Halperin v. Kissinger, No. 77-2014 (D.C. Cir. July 12, 1979);
Smith v. Nixon, No. 78-1526, (D.C. Cir. July 12, 1979).
165. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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the publication of an article for reasons of national security.
Judge Warren swept aside prior law in order to reach the deci-
sion. In addition, he did not require the government to produce
evidence sufficient to fulfill the very heavy burden that any at-
tempt at prior restraint must meet. And to cap it off in
Kafkaesque style, Judge Warren's opinion was kept secret.16 6
Two lessons may be drawn from the Progressive case: first,
the mere assertion of "national security" is enough to make
some judges run for cover; and second, Judge Warren saw the
State's asserted interests as preeminent and simply refused to
enforce the plain language of the first amendment and first
amendment case law that has existed since Near v. Minne-
sota.167 Judge Warren apparently did not even attempt to bal-
ance the interests involved; or if he did, he incorrectly
identified the interests of the defendants. In the Progressive
case, the publishers, editors, and writers posed an issue beyond
that of a tiny (40,000 circulation) magazine; what was involved
is not merely their interests, as important as they are, but the
interests of the entire nation-all of the people, who fall within
the ambit of the first amendment. The magazine in this litiga-
tion was a surrogate for all Americans. The government speaks
for the State, not for the disparate congeries of individuals and
groups that make up "society." Once that fact is understood, a
federal district judge should be able to discern that censorship
of a magazine article, the contents of which were taken from
the public record, cannot comport with the Constitution.
These illustrations are merely present-day instances of
what has long been true but has seldom been asserted: the
State wins in constitutional litigation in all cases in which it-
the State, speaking through government-considers its inter-
ests to be in jeopardy. In other words, the State is a group-per-
son with drives and interests of its own, which do not
necessarily coincide with the interests of Americans, either as
166. See 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at page opposite 1113 (June 26, 1979) (On
June 15, Judge Warren continued his earlier preliminary injunction against
publication and issued a one-sentence public statement and a seven-page se-
cret opinion in support of his action.). The Progressive appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, but, in September, the government dropped its efforts to enjoin publi-
cation after the sensitive information (relating to construction of nuclear de-
vices) was published elsewhere. See id. at page opposite 1545 (Sept. 25, 1979).
The Seventh Circuit then vacated the injunction and remanded all unresolved
issues to Judge Warren. The Progressive is still seeking to have the opinion
and in camera district court proceedings declassified. Telephone interview
with Erwin Knoll, Editor of The Progressive (Feb. 1, 1980).
167. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For recent discussion, see J. BARRON & C. DiENEs,
HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS ch. 2 (1979).
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individuals or in their collective capacity as society-the arith-
metical sum of the private interests of the nation.168 As the
Constitution of Control slowly emerges from its chrysalis, this
conclusion will become more evident. The greatest good in this
dangerous situation is defined as the survival of the collectivity
known as the United States. Machiavelli probably would have
approved; that is, the Machiavelli who wrote The Prince rather
than Machiavelli the statesman of The Discourses. "Many," he
said in The Prince, "have dreamed up republics and principali-
ties which have never in truth been known to exist; the gulf be-
tween how one should live and how one does live is so wide
that a man who neglects what is actually done for what should
be done learns the way to self-destruction rather than self-pres-
ervation. The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in
every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are
not virtuous. Therefore if a prince wants to maintain his rule he
must learn how not to be virtuous, and to make use of this or
not according to need."169 Substitute "a State" for "a prince,"
and much of American constitutional history unfolds-particu-
larly the history of recent vintage. The teachings of The Prince
may be repulsive, but the harsh fact is that most people, includ-
ing politicians, follow those teachings in practice.
Machiavelli frankly admitted that in practice those who
govern (formally or tacitly) are always willing to act ruthlessly
to achieve their ends. He knew that a ruler should be both
loved and feared, but he also saw that if it appears to be diffi-
cult to have both, then "it is far better to be feared than
loved."170 But, he cautioned, a ruler should escape being hated,
not because of moral scruples, but because it is in his best in-
terests (vide Batista of Cuba, the Shah of Iran, and Samoza of
Nicaragua). Finally, so long as the ruler "does not rob the great
majority of their property or their honor, they remain content.
He then has to contend only with the restlessness of a few, and
168. President Kennedy's statement, see note 154 supra, evidenced (per-
haps unwittingly) pure Machiavellianism. What the President called "the pub-
lic interest" may be equated with the State. See also Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F.
Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979). In Barcelo, Judge Torruella denied an injunction
against the Secretary of Defense and the Navy, even though defendants admit-
tedly were in violation of two federal statutes and an executive order. This
case is a clear example of how national defense considerations can override
even the letter of the law, an example of "judicially recognized Reason of
State."
169. N. MACHAVELL, THE PRINCE, ch. XV (G. Bull trans. paperback ed.
1961) (emphasis added).
170. Id. ch. XVI.
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that can be dealt with easily and in a variety of ways.'1 71 Thus,
so long as the confrontations in Halkin v. Helms and United
States v. The Progressive are perceived as being between a few
discrete individuals and the State, such "restlessness ... can
be dealt with easily."
C. INSTRUMENTALISM IN LAw
Despite outward appearances to the contrary, a decline in
interdictory constitutional law is fast becoming apparent.
When the third Constitution (of Powers) edged aside and over-
lapped the second Constitution (of Quasi-Limitations), a proc-
ess began in which the actions of government were limited less
by prohibitory rules of law than by technical considerations
and the political system. Thus, the question for policy makers
today is not: Do the rules permit the proposed action? Instead,
it is: Is the action physically and politically possible? The limi-
tations promulgated in 1787, 1791, and 1868 still exist, to be sure,
but they are applied as limitations only in situations in which
the State has no overriding interest. Neither the fundamental
law nor the Supreme Court will stop the drift of public policy
from the direction in which political officers want it to go. Con-
stitutional law, in sum, has become instrumental.
This important jurisprudential development did not spring
forth full-blown, like Aphrodite, in the past few decades. The
beginnings of the development may be seen in early American
history. What Professor Morton Horwitz has concluded about
the common law is equally true for constitutional law:
By 1820 the legal landscape in America bore only the faintest re-
semblance to what existed forty years earlier. While the words were
often the same, the structure of thought had dramatically changed and
with it the theory of law. Law was no longer conceived of as an eternal
set of principles expressed in custom and derived from natural law.
Nor was it regarded primarily as a body of rules designed to achieve
justice only in the individual case. Instead, judges came to think of the
common law as equally responsible with legislation for governing soci-
ety and promoting socially desirable conduct. The emphasis on law as
an instrument of policy encouraged innovation and allowed judges to
formulate legal doctrine with the self-conscious goal of bringing about
social change.
1 7 2
This statement reads remarkably like what the Supreme
Court and other courts have been overtly doing for at least a
generation, an action for which they have been severely criti-
171. Id. ch. XIX.
172. M. HoRwrrz, THE T.ANSFORMATON OF AMERIcAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 30
(1977). See Robinson, The Routinization of Crisis Government, 63 YALE REV.
"161 (1973).
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cized.173 Since as early as the time of Cooper v. Aaron,174 the
Court has occasionally, but not always, viewed a lawsuit as
more than a dispute to be decided "by a body of rules designed
to achieve justice only in the individual case."17 5 The Court has
issued norms of "general applicability." 7 6 Indeed, it does have
"the self-conscious goal of bringing about social change." Con-
sider, in this connection, the valedictory of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, in which he said: "We, of course, venerate the past,
but our focus is on the problems of the day and of the future as
far as we can foresee it."117 He went on to say that in one
sense the Court was similar to the President, for it had the
awesome responsibility of at times speaking the last word "in
great governmental affairs"s78 and of speaking for the public
generally. "It is a responsibility," he continued, "that is made
more difficult in this Court because we have no constituency.
We serve no majority. We serve no minority. We serve only the
public interest as we see it, guided only by the Constitution and
our own consciences. 179
That remarkable burst of candor merits careful attention.
It acknowledges that the Court follows an instrumentalist con-
cept of their function. Twenty years ago, a colleague and I sug-
gested that the time had come for an avowedly teleological
jurisprudence, "one purposive in nature."180 Enough has oc-
curred since then to conclude that our suggestion should not
have been a call for teleological jurisprudence but a descrip-
tion of what the Supreme Court and other courts were already
173. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Glazer, To-
wards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INTEREST 104 (1975). But see Miller, Ju-
dicial Activism and American Constitutionalism: Some Notes and Reflections,
in NoMos XX: CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 16, at 333; Miller, The Case for
Judicial Activism, in S. HALPERN & C. LAMB, SUPREME COURT ACTVSM AND RE-
STRAINT (to be published in 1980); Tribe, Seven Pluralist Fallacies: In Defense
of the Adversary Process-A Reply to Justice Rehnquist, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 43
(1978).
174. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). This was the Little Rock school desegregation case.
175. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
176. These are "legislative" norms that purport to state law for the entire
nation. Little attention has been accorded this development in scholarly cir-
cles. But see P. KURLAND, PoLrncs, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT
170-206 (1970); Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and
the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L REV.
1187 (1975), reprinted in A.S. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURM. MYTH AND REALITY
253 (1978) (ch. 8).
177. 395 U.S. viii, x (1969).
178. Id. at xi.
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. Cm. L. REV. 661, 684 (1960).
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doing and a prediction of what they would continue to do. We
are now witnessing "the growth of systematic participation of
the judiciary ... in the travail of society."'81 There can be no
doubt that law is instrumental under the Constitution of Con-
trol.
D. SOME SPECIFIC DocTRwNs
The generalized statements about the Constitution of Con-
trol set forth above can be supplemented with a brief enumera-
tion of specific doctrines. These observations will be stated as
conclusions, with little documentation. Each, however, can eas-
ily be verified by readily accessible literature. The citations to
the statements below are merely illustrative.
1. Presidential government has come to stay. Despite the
popular wisdom to the contrary, Watergate and its aftermath
have created only the appearance of a renascent Congress.182
2. Despite the recent Supreme Court decisions in support
of states' rights, 183 federalism as it has been known is fast be-
coming moribund. A national income tax, technological imper-
atives, immersion of the nation in world affairs-these and
other factors mean that the several states are political anachro-
nisms.184
3. Overt economic planning has come to stay. 8 5 Although
some primitive forms of planning have always existed in the
United States, the steady and inexorable trend since the 1930s
has been toward more and more governmental planning. Tax-
ing and spending powers are now used to further economic
planning objectives. The result, in Professor Kenneth Dam's
terminology, is the creation of "the fiscal constitution."186
4. The commerce clause has been broadly interpreted to
permit extensive exercise of powers at the national level; for
example, it provides constitutional warrant for economic plan-
181. A. PEKELIS, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION: SELECTED ESSAYS 39 (M. Konvitz
ed. 1950).
182. Cf. R. Pious, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 419-20 (1979) ("The only cer-
tain forecast about the presidency is that no forecast is certain.").
183. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-52 (1976).
184. Currently, a national economic system is superimposed on a decentral-
ized political order. Politics and law tend to follow economics; the inexorable
result is that the states will become even less important in the future. See A.S.
MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW, supra note 126, at 43-95 (1979)
(ch. 3, 'The Constitutional Law of the 'Security State' ").
185. See N. CHAMBERLAIN, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PLANNING (1965); G. SOULE,
PLANNING: U.S.A. (1967). See also F. ALLrINE & F. TARPLEY, THE NEW STATE OF
THE ECONOMY (1977).
186. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CI. L. REV. 271 (1977).
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ning. Of equal importance, federal power over interstate com-
merce is the constitutional justification for a growing number of
social regulations.8 7
5. Freedoms of speech and the press are receiving less pro-
tection.188
6. Paradoxically, certain liberties not considered to be in-
imical to the State now receive the highest degree of protection
ever enjoyed by Americans.189
7. When the State's fisc is threatened, the fourth amend-
ment gives way.190
8. The constitutional command of equal protection of the
laws is more fantasy than fact. Concentration upon what judg-
es say about equal protection, rather than upon what other
governmental officials do, hides a harsh reality.191
9. The Nixon Court is chipping away at the protections of
187. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976), is the
most prominent example of this justification. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 300-05 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
249-62 (1964).
188. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1968) (speech);
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979) (press).
189. E.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (private possession of
obscene matter). The idea is proffered in Miller, Constitutional Law, supra
note 123, at 748-50.
190. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1971).
191. Granted, equal protection law has advanced significantly since Holmes
attacked it as the usual last resort of constitutional arguments. Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (upholding compulsory sterilization of an allegedly men-
tally defective person). Indeed, the civil rights movement of the 1960s was, in
large part, a by-product of judicial willingness to reinterpret the equal protec-
tion clause. My point, however, is that although the formal law has greatly
changed, the same is not true of law as applied to individuals. The law in ac-
tion-how people are actually treated by public officials, including judges (as in
sentencing)-fails to measure up to the promise of the formal, positive law.
See, e.g., W. WasoN, supra note 33, passim; Miller, Brown's 25th A Silver Lin-
ing Tarnished with Time, 3 DIsT. LAw., April-May 1979, at 22 (Journal of the
District of Columbia Bar). In other words, the teaching of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886), should be the basic standard for all legal analysis.
What matters is not what officials, including legislators and judges, say, but
what they do. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JusTicE 79-80 (1976).
Legal educators have forgotten the teachings of Underhill Moore and
others, who, forty to fifty years ago, sought to determine how legal precepts
were in fact applied. Most law professors still consider the appellate court
opinion to be the ne plus ultra of scholarship-a sad commentary on legal edu-
cation. But even appellate opinions are given only cursory scrutiny. Little or
nothing is said, for example, about how judges inform themselves, about their
predilections, and about how they weigh (if they do) the societal impacts of
their decisions. Thus, the adversary system is never subjected to rigorous ex-
amination. See generally A.S. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REAL-
rry (1978); Miller, Reductionism in the Law Schools, or, Why the Blather About
the Motivation of Legislators?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 891 (1979); Miller, Legal
Education as a Form of Brain Damage (forthcoming).
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Miranda and other decisions.192
10. Ours is emphatically a government of men, not of
laws.193 In the "administrative State," discretion is the norm,
and judicial review of public administration is largely ineffec-
tual.
E. SUMMARY
It is dubious, at best, whether institutions created prior to
1790-despite nearly two centuries of adaptation-are adequate
to meet the needs of the present and the emergent future. The
Constitution of Control has arisen to strengthen a government
faced by continuing crises. "There is no escape from politics.
As a consequence of ecological scarcity, major ethical, political,
economic and social changes are inevitable whatever we do."'194
Legal education and constitutional law as formulated by law-
yers reveal little or no appreciation of that dialectic. Public dia-
logue should focus on the precipitant question of whether
Americans will be able to escape the impact of Arnold
Toynbee's doleful forecast: "In all developed countries," he
was quoted in 1975 as saying, "a new way of life-a severely
regimented way-will have to be imposed by a ruthless author-
itarian government."195
The outlines of the Constitution of Control are becoming
clearly visible, a process that will accelerate as fast-moving
technological and economic changes press ever harder on an-
cient political institutions. I do not, however, wish to unduly
accentuate the transition. The fourth fundamental law coexists
with the second and third: We still have some limitations on
government. Moreover, the Constitution of Control is simply a
radical version of the Constitution of Powers. The effective ex-
ercise of burgeoning governmental powers necessarily implies
increasing limitations on personal freedoms and liberties. 96
Those liberties that remain may be likened to Aldous Huxley's
192. Early analysis may be found in L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAw: THE NIXON
COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974). See R. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CoUN-
TERREVOLUTION? 330-32 (1977); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary
View, 90 HARv. L. REV. 293 (1976).
193. See HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER (1952); Gramm, Industrial Cap-
italism and Breakdown of the Liberal Rule of Law, 7 J. ECON. ISSUES 577
(1973).
194. W. OpHuLs, supra note 146, at 161-62.
195. Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 10, 1975, at 5, col. 7 (quoting Arnold
Toynbee).
196. See generally W. Opmn.s, supra note 146.
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"soma" pills-a means by which discontent can be siphoned
off.19 7
V. CONCLUSION
This Article, a speculative essay, is intended to raise ques-
tions rather than to proffer answers. If I am correct-and I
think that at least a prima facie case can be made for the new
fundamental law, thus shifting the burden of proof to those
who dispute the thesis-then a challenge to constitutional
scholarship is both obvious and unmet. That challenge is to de-
termine whether politico-legal (constitutional) changes will en-
able Americans (and others) to escape from the ecological trap.
Such an inquiry must have at least two facets. First, it
must encompass an analysis of the extent to which law, how-
ever and by whomever articulated, can be an instrument of so-
cial change. The ancient wisdom, per Sumner, is that
"stateways" cannot change 'folkways."1 98 I have suggested
elsewhere, in an as yet unpublished paper, that the Supreme
Court can and indeed does help promulgate national goals.199
Acting as an "oracle in the Marble Palace," the Court tries to
operate as a modern version of Plato's philosopher-king. In
making such a statement, I do not mean to suggest that "the
universe will obey the judicial decree."2 00 I agree with Brooks
Adams, who observed that "[n] o delusion could be profounder
and none, perhaps, more dangerous." 201 Constitutional change
comes not only by amendment and judicial decision but also by
certain acts of Congress and the President.202 The parts of the
system interact. Judges have some, but not much, direct politi-
cal power. Their greatest influence comes through stating stan-
dards toward which Americans can aspire; they can alter the
"mix" in political debates. Although our reach, as in all things,
may exceed our grasp, a carefully chosen group of judges who
realize that decisions can, at times, be logically arbitrary and at
the same time sociologically nonarbitrary can help in the end-
less pursuit of justice-of what Felix Cohen called "the
good."203 Of course, judges are far from omnipotent; they are,
197. See A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 70-71, 121-23 (1932).
198. See W. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906).
199. Miller, The Case for Judicial Activism, supra note 173.
200. B. ADAMS, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS 219 (1913), quoted in A.
MASON, SECURTY THROUGH FREEDOM 149 (1955).
201. Id.
202. See A.S. MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW, supra note
126.
203. See F. COHEN, supra note 27.
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however, best suited not only to make other governmental offi-
cials take a sober second thought before implementing deci-
sions, but also to assist in the establishment of national values.
The Constitution, in itself, is not a self-defining instrument that
sets forth such values. Only as a patina of interpretation is ad-
ded do those values emerge. 204
The second facet of the constitutional reexamination must
be to redraft our constitutional text. The ancient words of 1787
need substantial alteration. Built-in roadblocks frustrate effi-
ciency in government and do not prevent despotism. The or-
thodoxy tells us, usually quoting Brandeis and at times
Warren, that separation of powers was designed not to promote
efficiency but to prevent the misuse of power.20 5 That, how-
ever, is only a half-truth. The framers in 1787 wanted to sepa-
rate the executive from Congress in order to have a more
effective government. 206 The institutions have worked for
nearly two hundred years largely because of extra-constitu-
tional techniques devised to supplement what the framers cre-
ated and, as we have said above, because the silences of the
original document were filled by principles (except for judicial
review) common to all governments.
Constitutional revision by custom and usage, however, is
no longer adequate to meet the manifest needs of the nation.
Americans are now hampered by the terms of a written instru-
ment drafted for different times and conditions. Among possi-
ble constitutional changes, at least the following require
serious consideration: (a) pluralizing the presidency; (b) mak-
ing Congress a unicameral body of not more than 100 members;
(c) making the entire bureaucracy responsible to the President
and to Congress; (d) eliminating the fifty states and creating
not more than ten to twelve regional governments; (e) constitu-
tionalizing the giant corporations 20 7 and other pluralistic social
204. See Murphy, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary
Showing, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 130, 147-55 (M.
Harmon ed. 1978).
205. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (Warren, C.J.); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
206. See, e.g., L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POUcY 1-27
(1972). Dr. Fisher has been the leader in modern reinterpretation of separation
of powers. He asserts that it was because Congressional government under the
Articles of Confederation was ineffectual that a separate executive-the Presi-
dent-was created. In other words, the founding fathers wanted to prevent
despotism and promote efficiency in government.
207. See Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corporate
Beast, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. (1979); Miller, Toward "Constitutionalizing" the Cor-
poration: A Speculative Essay, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 187 (1978).
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groups; (f) allowing the Supreme Court to issue advisory opin-
ions at the request of other organs of government and stan-
dards of national purpose as well; (g) constitutionalizing the
political party; (h) establishing a "devil's advocate" within gov-
ernment; (i) requiring a social audit of all governmental pro-
grams; (j) enlarging the environmental impact statement
requirement to mandate "social impact statements" for all pro-
posed governmental actions; and (k) establishing an ecological
planning unit in the federal government.
The listing of such changes points up the staggering dimen-
sions of the constitutional crisis in which Americans are now
deeply immersed. Whether such fundamental alterations can
help achieve a good society is an unanswered question. How-
ever glorious the past may have been, stolid adherence to con-
cepts developed by people long dead-the Founding Fathers-
will not serve the pressing needs of the modern era. Those
people-the saints in America's hagiology-should not be ig-
nored. Indeed, they cannot be. But their answer for the cli-
macteric of humankind may be simply stated: solve your own
problems. The drafters of the Constitution of 1787 left it up to
each generation of Americans to write its own fundamental
law. That has been done in the past by making the written
Constitution in large part arf unwritten one. Such an approach,
however, is no longer adequate.
Finally, those who think about American constitutionalism
should begin with Machiavelli. As Sir Isaiah Berlin puts it: "In
the famous fifteenth chapter of The Prince he [Machiavelli]
says that liberality, mercy, honour, humanity, frankness, chasti-
ty, religion, and so forth, are indeed virtues, and a life lived in
the exercise of these virtues would be successful 'if men were
all good.' But they are not; and it is idle to hope that they will
become so. We must take men as we find them, and seek to im-
prove them along possible, not impossible, lines .... [H] uman
societies in fact stand in need of leadership, and cannot be-
come what they should be, save by the effective pursuit of
power, of stability, virtt, greatness."208 Anyone who wishes to
think seriously about constitutionalism in the United States to-
day must come to terms with the challenges laid down by
Machiavelli nearly five centuries ago.
208. Berlin, .supra note 22, at 175-76 (footnote omitted).
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